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Abstract 
Urban governance after urban renewal: 
The legacies of renewal and the logics of neighbourhood action  
in post-renewal Little Burgundy (1979 – 1995) 
Kiley Goyette 
 
Urban renewal is perhaps the most widely studied approach to transforming neighbourhoods, but 
less attention has been given to its lasting effects and its influence on the forms of governance 
that emerged after it ended. This study of the Montreal neighbourhood of Little Burgundy 
explores how the physical, social, and ideological conditions left by urban renewal shaped 
neighbourhood action in the post-renewal period by focusing on three aspects. The first, a logic 
of governance stressing community participation, emerges as citizen committees contested 
renewal and problematized the top-down plans of outside experts. In the post-renewal period, 
this thesis argues, community participation became the major source of legitimacy for 
neighbourhood action, a logic that came to be reflected in the activities of groups like the Little 
Burgundy Coalition as well as the municipal state. The second is a concern with concentrated 
poverty in neighbourhood sociodemographic governance, frequently traced in the literature as 
emerging in the post-renewal period. In contrast, this thesis shows that this preoccupation 
emerged much earlier (during the renewal period itself) and was less prominent in the post-
renewal period. Third, this study shows how both police actions and responses to police were 
part of the efforts to transform the neighbourhood, an area neglected in post-renewal governance 
literature. Tracing the connections between these areas shows how the impact of urban renewal 
extended beyond the transformations of the renewal period, but instead continued to shape the 
ways community participation, sociodemographic management, and policing were part of urban 
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1. Introduction 
Among the approaches to transforming neighbourhoods, urban renewal is perhaps the most 
dramatic and widely studied. Though authors have different definitions of what constitutes urban 
renewal, in broadest terms it describes a post-war form of urban governance in which centrally-
planned, expert-led programs facilitated the clearance of urban areas identified as blighted (often 
areas of working-class housing that had fallen into disrepair) to build new structures according to 
the principles of Modernist planning. Whether these demolitions made way for highways or 
high-rise housing, urban renewal transformed the social landscape as much as the built 
environment through the massive displacement and resettlement that resulted. By the 1970s, 
urban renewal had been largely discredited and abandoned as a coherent approach to planning, 
although some countries continued to use modified aspects of it.  
Urban governance itself has multiple definitions, but here I use the term to represent the 
collection of actors, policies, and practices that are part of attempts to regulate the physical 
and/or social conditions of a city or neighbourhood. These actors may include elected officials at 
various levels of government, but may also include urban planners, public housing officers, 
business people, developers, police, citizens, and their respective institutions or associations. 
Urban renewal, as a form of urban governance, has no shortage of research on its creation, 
deployment, and demise. Some of this work examines how the actors, logics, and practices 
constitutive of urban renewal governance came together.1 Other work in this vein highlights the 
impacts renewal had on residents,2 while still others examine renewal as a site of ideological 
                                                 
1 John Bauman, Public Housing, Race and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974 (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1987); Robert Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York City 
(New York: Vintage, 1975); Kevin Fox Gotham, “A City without Slums: Urban Renewal, Public Housing, and 
Downtown Revitalization in Kansas City, Missouri,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 60, no. 1 
(2001): 285–316; Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Christopher Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: 
Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin, Historical Studies of Urban America (Chicago London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2012); Raymond A Mohl, “The Interstates and the Cities: The U.S. Department of Transportation 
and the Freeway Revolt, 1966–1973,” Journal of Policy History 20, no. 2 (2008); Douglas W. Rae, City: Urbanism 
and Its End (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: 
Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996); Jon C. Teaford, The 
Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985, Creating the North American Landscape 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Samuel Zipp, Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban 
Renewal in Cold War New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
2 Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal: 1949–62 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1964); Herbert Gans, “The Failure of Urban Renewal,” Commentary, April 1, 1965; Harold Kaplan, Urban 
Renewal Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); James Q. Wilson, “Planning and Politics: Citizen 
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contestation, documenting how citizens and scholars responded to the assumptions, processes, 
and power structures that constituted this form of governance.3  
While research on urban renewal itself is abundant, much less attention has been directed 
toward the forms of governance that emerged in the places that had been dramatically 
transformed by urban renewal after it was no longer being used. There are, to be sure, many 
studies of the forms of urban governance that emerged in the period after renewal (i.e., the 1970s 
and 80s). But very seldom do these studies connect the new forms of urban governance to the 
specific physical and social conditions created by renewal. How have the physical, social, and 
ideological legacies of urban renewal shaped the development of these neighbourhoods? How 
did citizens, governments, or other actors attempt to transform the conditions of the 
neighbourhoods that resulted from urban renewal? What new logics of neighbourhood action 
did these efforts produce? These questions, under-examined in the existing literature, lie at the 
centre of the research I present here.  
This thesis project explores the relationship between urban renewal and post-renewal 
urban governance by responding to these questions through an historical case study of the efforts 
to transform one Montreal neighbourhood, Little Burgundy, during the post-renewal period 
(approximately 1979 – 1995). Little Burgundy is a deindustrialized neighbourhood that has been 
the centre of Montreal’s Black anglophone population since the 1880s. Between 1965 and 1978, 
Little Burgundy was the site of urban renewal demolitions that made way for low-income public 
housing and an expressway, displacing many long-time residents and fracturing the community.   
Urban renewal in Little Burgundy, as elsewhere, has been relatively well studied.4 What 
has not been studied is how the physical and social conditions created during this renewal period 
shaped the forms of governance that emerged in the years thereafter. My research shows that 
post-renewal conditions defined many of the “problems” that efforts to transform the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Participation in Urban Renewal,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29, no. 4 (November 1963): 242–49; 
Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961). 
3 Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York City; Chester Hartman, Yerba Buena: Land Grab 
and Community Resistance in San Francisco (San Francisco CA: Glide Publications, 1974); Klemek, The 
Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal; Rae, City: Urbanism and Its End; Zipp, Manhattan Projects: The Rise 
and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York. 
4 See for example Robert Mayer, “L’idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec (quartier St-Roch) et à Montréal 
(quartier Petite Bourgogne)” (Doctoral dissertation, Université Laval, 1976); S. Y. Piotte, “La rénovation urbaine et 
le phénomène de pression: étude monographique, le cas de la Petite Bourgogne” (Master’s thesis, Université de 
Montréal, 1970); Jean Lavigne, “La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne” (Doctoral dissertation, Université 
Laval, 1971). 
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neighbourhood in the 1980s and 1990s would attempt to address and also shaped the nature of 
the responses themselves.  By examining the connections between these two periods in Little 
Burgundy, I shown how urban renewal continued to influence the logics of neighbourhood 
development even after renewal itself had been discontinued. 
During the post-renewal period, Little Burgundy was the site of a new security problem 
known as the ‘crack crisis.’ Drug use and trafficking were accompanied by violent crime that left 
many residents afraid to leave their homes. Every account of the crack crisis, which peaked 
between 1989 and 1992, depicts the most significant event of the neighbourhood’s history as the 
urban renewal program of the 1960s and 1970s.5 These reiterated links between urban renewal 
and the post-renewal conditions suggest that Little Burgundy is an appropriate case study for this 
research. In reality, this project was advanced in response to a reoccurring question in my 
exploratory research: why was it when I asked about the events of the 1990s, people always told 
me about the urban renewal program? 
This introductory chapter lays the foundations for the subsequent chapters which detail 
my research. It begins by reviewing the literature that considers urban governance in post-
renewal neighbourhoods. From this literature, I retained three themes which guided my 
investigation of this subject in Little Burgundy: first, that top-down, state-led actions were 
delegitimized through the failure of renewal, constraining the possibilities for action in the post-
renewal period; second, that community participation took on a growing importance in urban 
governance; and third, that problems of post-renewal neighbourhoods were often framed as the 
result of a concentration of poverty, and through this understanding of the problem, the solutions 
proposed sought to establish an appropriate sociodemographic balance or ‘social mix.’ To these 
three themes I add a fourth: the role of police and policing. Though little work on this topic 
appears in the literature, attention to policing was essential to understanding urban governance in 
post-renewal Little Burgundy. As I outline the existing scholarly work on these four themes I 
                                                 
5 For example, Janin Hadlaw, “Locating Crisis: Representations of Race and Space in the English Media, Montreal 
1987-1992” (Master’s thesis, Concordia University, 1996); Robert Mackrous, “Le développement social à partir de 
l’habitat,” in L’habitation comme vecteur de lien social, ed. Paul Morin and Evelyne Baillergeau (Québec: Presses 
de l’Université de Québec, 2008), 131–53; Office municipal d’habitation de Montréal, Mieux loger les Montréalais: 
40 ans de logement social public (Montréal: Office municipal d’habitation de Montréal, 2011); Éléni Reed, 
“Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin : problématique et principes d’intervention” (Master’s thesis, School of Urban 
Planning, McGill University, 1994); Brandon C. Welsh and Claude Roy, “Un habitat plus sûr: Réunion nord-
américaine sur la prévention de la criminalité dans les collectivités de logements social” (Montréal, Québec, March 
1996). 
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also highlight how my research contributes to them by giving attention to the way the urban 
renewal program shaped the governance initiatives and the conditions that these attempted to 
change. The methods and sources used to answer my research questions conclude this chapter. 
1.1 Post-renewal urban governance literature 
The literature on urban renewal itself is relatively vast. Urban renewal, the literature 
demonstrates, is a form of urban governance that dramatically transformed the physical and 
social landscapes of cities throughout North America and Europe during the mid-twentieth 
century. Characterized by large-scale, state-led demolitions of blighted areas to make way for 
new construction, urban renewal was widely implemented in neighbourhoods near city centres 
that were home to marginalized populations. Though local deployment varied—some cleared the 
way for expressway infrastructure while others constructed public housing or conference 
centres—these programs shared coherence through a set of Modernist logics that became 
incorporated into the cultural, political, and architectural processes that formed the “urban 
renewal order.”6  
 Urban renewal came to an end 25-30 years after it began. The disastrous consequences of 
renewal for displaced residents combined with scant evidence that the programs benefited either 
individuals or communities caused the renewal model to be labelled a failure in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, only a few decades after it had been enthusiastically taken up. The lofty 
objectives, violent displacement, grassroots contestation, and recognized failure of urban renewal 
programs have made them rich subject matter for researchers in urban geography and urban 
history, and in recent years there has been renewed interest in placing these histories into wider 
social and political context.7 
While the demise of renewal is well studied, its legacies are not. What were the 
conditions left by urban renewal and what forms of governance formed in response to those 
conditions? This literature review considers the legacies of urban renewal and their role in 
shaping urban governance by examining a literature that I have defined on post-renewal urban 
governance. This post-renewal urban governance literature is made up of a collection of 
                                                 
6 Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal. 
7 Samuel Zipp and Michael Carriere, “Introduction: Thinking through Urban Renewal,” Journal of Urban History 
39, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 359–65, doi:10.1177/0096144212467305. 
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academic works that, though not necessarily in direct dialogue, are interested in how actors 
attempted to transform neighbourhoods in the aftermath of urban renewal, a period stretching 
roughly from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. Within this literature I include articles on urban 
governance that emerged in response to the physical conditions directly created by urban renewal 
programs. However, I did not include articles that were limited to the conditions within public 
housing, though these were often a result of urban renewal. Articles about public housing were 
included if they were discussed in relation to the governance of the neighbourhood or city more 
broadly.   
The majority of academic writing on post-renewal urban governance is focused on the 
United States. One transatlantic comparison also included two European cities (Berlin and 
London) and Toronto.8 Toronto is featured in most of this scholarship on Canada, often related to 
public housing in that city, including multiple studies on Regent Park, Canada’s first public 
housing project.9 Richard White has argued that the outcome of Toronto’s urban renewal owed 
much to steady economic growth during a period in which many cities were facing the 
devastating effects of deindustrialization and global economic restructuring.10 This suggests that 
Toronto may not be generalizable to other Canadian cities which did not enjoy the same status as 
growing financial centers. While studies of urban renewal in other Canadian cities exist, 
discussion of post-renewal urban governance is largely absent.11    
                                                 
8 Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal. 
9 Martine August, “Revitalisation Gone Wrong: Mixed-Income Public Housing Redevelopment in Toronto’s Don 
Mount Court,” Urban Studies 53, no. 16 (December 1, 2016): 3405–22; Martine August, “‘It’s All about Power and 
You Have None:’ The Marginalization of Tenant Resistance to Mixed-Income Social Housing Redevelopment in 
Toronto, Canada,” Cities 57 (September 2016): 25–32; Ryan K. James, “From ‘Slum Clearance’ to ‘Revitalisation’: 
Planning, Expertise and Moral Regulation in Toronto’s Regent Park,” Planning Perspectives 25, no. 1 (January 
2010): 69–86; Stefan Kipfer and Jason Petrunia, “‘Recolonization’ and Public Housing: A Toronto Case Study,” 
Studies in Political Economy 83 (2009): 111–39; Tom Slater, “Municipally Managed Gentrification in South 
Parkdale, Toronto,” The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe Canadien 48, no. 3 (September 2004): 303–25; 
Richard White, “Urban Renewal Revisited: Toronto, 1950 to 1970,” Canadian Historical Review 97, no. 1 (March 
2016): 1–33. 
10 White, “Urban Renewal Revisited.” 
11 Catherine Charlebois and Paul André Linteau, eds., Quartiers disparus: Red Light, Faubourg à M’lasse, Goose 
Village (Montréal (Québec): Éditions Cardinal Inc, 2014); Martin Drouin, “De la démolition des taudis à la 
sauvegarde du patrimoine bâti (Montréal, 1954-1973),” Urban History Review 41, no. 1 (2012): 22, 
doi:10.7202/1013762ar; Tina Loo, “Africville and the Dynamics of State Power in Postwar Canada,” Acadiensis 
XXXIX, no. 2 (Summer/Autumn 2010): 23–47; Margaret T. Rockwell, “Modernism and the Functional City: Urban 
Renewal in Hamilton, Ontario and Buffalo New York (1949 - 1974).” (Doctoral dissertation, McMaster University, 
2013). 
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Definition, logics, failure 
What is widely understood as urban renewal is also widely understood to have failed. However, 
the terms of this failure depend upon the way urban renewal is defined. Some scholars have 
brought attention to the strict definition of the term and the ways this differs from the popular 
understanding.  The ‘federal bulldozer’ symbolized the popular understanding of urban renewal 
as the wholesale demolition of the old to make way for the new, whether for highways or 
housing.12 However, returning to the origin of the term in the United States introduced in the 
1954 Housing and Urban Renewal Act, Alexander von Hoffman demonstrated that ‘urban 
renewal’ had been conceived of as an alternative to the slum clearance which had been the basis 
of the earlier Housing Act of 1949.13 Urban renewal was intended to spur improvement 
incrementally through incentives and subsidies for renovation or other investments, but the term 
became popularly understood as analogous with demolition as the two were generally used in 
combination. Richard White made a similar assertion about urban renewal and public housing in 
Canada, which were technically separate programs but were implemented together so often that 
public housing projects were generally thought of as urban renewal.14 White demonstrated that 
only two urban renewal projects had been implemented in Toronto according to the strict 
definition that excluded public housing and went so far as to suggest that the lack of urban 
renewal programs might explain its perceived failure.  
Both these examples rely on federal definitions to evaluate what was or was not urban 
renewal, but other scholarship has demonstrated that urban renewal was not strictly a federal 
program, despite popular notions to the contrary. While many countries adopted policies that 
funded and defined the terms of urban renewal projects, and these policies were instrumental to 
the wide adoption of urban renewal, similar urban transformation also took place independent of 
federal programs. Jon Teaford compared federally-funded renewal projects in the United States 
with a long list of similar programs in cities that did not receive federal urban renewal funding in 
the same period.15 Kevin Fox Gotham demonstrated that private developers and real estate 
                                                 
12 Also the title of a contemporary critique by Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of 
Urban Renewal: 1949–62. 
13 Alexander von Hoffman, “The Lost History of Urban Renewal,” Journal of Urbanism: International Research on 
Placemaking and Urban Sustainability 1, no. 3 (November 2008): 281–301. 
14 White, “Urban Renewal Revisited.” 
15 Jon C. Teaford, “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath,” Housing Policy Debate 11, no. 2 (2000): 443–65. 
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interests played crucial roles in promoting and shaping urban renewal in Kansas City, Missouri.16 
These articles are a testament to the idea that urban renewal was more than a particular 
government program or definition, but an entire approach to urban governance. The ideas which 
underpinned it travelled and materialized through different actors and mechanisms.  
Christopher Klemek called the “convergence of forces” which underpinned this form of 
governance the “urban renewal order.”17 Approaching urban renewal as an order rather than a 
particular program allowed Klemek to account for the interlocking collection of architectural 
trends, professional expertise, policies, and political ideologies that made different forms of 
urban renewal recognizable even between cities in countries on both sides of the Atlantic. 
According to Klemek, urban renewal across the United States, Britain, Germany and Canada 
shared in common an attempt to address problems of post-war cities through an architectural 
form, legitimized by the expertise of planning professionals, which promised to establish order 
and efficiency. This architectural form was functional modernism, an approach to architecture 
that was also accompanied by an ideological order in which these ideas were seen as legitimate. 
These experts were entrusted with the authority to craft a variety of policies, which would also 
be based on the logics of modernism.  These policies, including slum clearance, highway 
construction, and large-scale public housing development, Klemek showed, went on to become 
tools that were available for municipal leaders which were incentivized by the funding made 
available through them. Used in whatever combination they believed would respond to their 
local needs, the multiple forms of urban governance that resulted would all be recognized as 
urban renewal by the general public because of the interrelations of expertise, policy, and 
ideology throughout various levels of the urban renewal order.  
What these authors indicate is that regardless of what the term ‘urban renewal’ was 
intended to mean, its popular understanding carried political weight, as did the popular 
consensus of its failure. Urban renewal lost much of its credibility through the outcry of the 
residents whose homes were to be destroyed to make way for the new construction. Resettling 
the displaced residents was often difficult in the context of housing shortages, and even where 
replacement housing was planned, the large-scale projects often took years to complete. The 
accounts of communities being destroyed and the highly-mediatized resistance from the residents 
                                                 
16 Gotham, “A City without Slums.” 
17 Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal, 12. 
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who fought against the renewal programs that threatened their neighbourhoods began a cycle of 
critiques and oppositional movements. When these programs failed to return businesses and 
middle-income families to urban centers, but instead seemed to reproduce the problems of urban 
poverty at alarming rates, the failure of urban renewal seemed unequivocal. A whole renewal 
“order” at this point began to unravel. At stake, one can assume, was the entire interlocking 
collection of architectural trends, professional expertise, policies, and political ideologies that 
propelled renewal until this time. 
Klemek, examining this unravelling, points toward one of the legacies of renewal: a crisis 
of legitimacy for some of the actors and logics that propelled renewal. The failure of renewal, he 
argued, served to delegitimize not only urban renewal itself but also the logics that underpinned 
it by limiting the possibilities for expert- and state-led planning in American and British cities 
after urban renewal had been discredited. He observed that in Toronto and Berlin, where 
backlash against urban renewal was less pronounced, government and planning professionals 
were able to maintain a leading role in urban governance even after the notion of urban renewal 
had soured. After a long decline, the end of urban renewal in the United States is usually marked 
at 1974, the year when the federal program was cut, and somewhat later for Britain.18 In Canada, 
federal support was withdrawn following the 1969 Hellyer Report, but programs that had already 
begun were allowed to complete. As a result, it was not until 1978 that the renewal period in 
Little Burgundy ended. Klemek argued that the failure of urban renewal had an impact on the 
development of urban governance to follow in constraining the possible responses to urban 
issues, and one of the legacies of urban renewal was discrediting forms of governance that relied 
too strongly on state- and expert-led initiatives. In chapter two I discuss how, in keeping with 
Klemek’s analysis, citizen contestation of the Little Burgundy renewal program worked to 
discredit planning approaches that imposed expert plans without the input of the people they 
would affect. This discrediting cleared the way for new forms and logics of governance, some of 
which have been documented in the studies to which I now turn.      
Community participation in post-renewal urban governance 
The role of community members and organizations in urban governance is another theme that 
emerges in the post-renewal urban governance literature. The proliferation of citizen resistance 
                                                 
18 Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal. 
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to urban renewal, discussed above, signalled the beginning of the end for urban renewal and 
effectively delegitimized the urban renewal order as a viable form of urban governance. 
Community-based initiatives, which emerged during and after the renewal period, could then 
gain credence as alternatives to top-down planning. Klemek described organizations in Harlem 
and Philadelphia that were working against the grain of expert-led urban renewal through 
community-based planning projects and had the potential to provide an alternative form of urban 
governance. However, by the time urban renewal had been delegitimized, the withdrawal of 
federal funding from community organizations seriously constrained the capacity of locally-run 
organizations such as these and made them unable to fill the gap in available governance 
models.19 In these contexts, at least, it was not the existing community organizations that became 
involved in post-renewal governance. 
Within the literature reviewed here, community approval is widely recognised as a 
political need for post-renewal urban governance, whether led by municipalities or private 
developers. The redevelopment of public housing at Regent Park relied on community 
consultation and participation to maintain legitimacy.20 If necessary, it was also possible to 
merely create the impression of community approval. Martine August cited tenants and 
organizers who claimed that dissenters to the project were being bought out, that those who 
spoke favourably were rewarded and their voices amplified, and that some residents kept their 
opinions to themselves because they felt the risk of repercussions was too great.21 In Chicago’s 
Pilsen neighbourhood, Sternberg and Anderson observed that while one post-renewal 
revitalization project was blocked by community opposition, a second project in which 
promoters aligned themselves with certain Mexican community associations was able to proceed 
despite opposition from local groups with a less pro-growth orientation.22 Community resistance 
has also been documented as halting the redevelopment of public housing. Plans to demolish 
public housing towers at Chicago’s Cabrini-Green and replace them with mixed-income housing 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 August, “It’s All About Power and You Have None”; James, “From ‘Slum Clearance’ to ‘Revitalisation’”; Kipfer 
and Petrunia, “‘Recolonization’ and Public Housing: A Toronto Case Study.” 
21 August, “It’s All about Power and You Have None.” 
22 C. Sternberg and M. Anderson, “Contestation and the Local Trajectories of Neoliberal Urban Governance in 
Chicago’s Bronzeville and Pilsen,” Urban Studies 51, no. 15 (November 1, 2014): 3198–3214. 
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were stalled for over a decade by opposition from residents who saw the net reduction of low-
income housing as an attack on their ability to survive.23  
Community organizations can also take the lead in urban governance. Hula, Jackson and 
Orr called these “governing non-profits.”24 Rather than offering a service or focusing on a 
specific cause, the authors defined governing non-profits as organizations having broadly defined 
goals related to the needs of the community and working within or attempting to reconfigure 
local political structures in order to address them. These groups may represent the interests of 
marginalized groups, as in the example of BUILD Baltimore, which pushed for better housing 
and employment conditions for African American and low-income residents in the wake of that 
city’s expensive downtown revitalization project. On the other hand, the examples of governing 
non-profits in Detroit and Los Angeles were formed by middle-class white residents following 
race riots in these cities in 1967 and 1992 respectively.25 Another example of governing non-
profits in the United States are Community Development Corporations (CDCs), which Owens  
described as local non-profits engaged in improving the social and physical conditions of the 
community.26 CDCs began in the 1960s but gained momentum during the 1980s until they were 
present in 95% of American cities over 100,000 people in the early 1990s, suggesting 
community involvement in urban governance through CDCs was a common theme across the 
country in the post-renewal period.27 Owens’ case study in South Jamaica, Queens, provides an 
example of a non-profit organization pursuing neighbourhood revitalization, notably by 
increasing homeownership and middle-class families to the area, but avoiding displacement of 
the existing community through a commitment to constructing affordable housing and improving 
conditions in rentals as well. The activities of the CDCs described by Owens demonstrate that 
the type of revitalization pursued through public-private partnerships could also be done through 
the participation of local non-profits instead of state actors.  
In Montreal, multisectoral neighbourhood roundtables (“tables de concertation de 
quartier” or “tables de quartier”) are a form of governing non-profit that has gained recognition 
                                                 
23 B. J. Miller, “The Struggle Over Redevelopment at Cabrini-Green, 1989-2004,” Journal of Urban History 34, no. 
6 (May 30, 2008): 944–60. 
24 R. C. Hula, C. Y. Jackson, and M. Orr, “Urban Politics, Governing Nonprofits, and Community Revitalization,” 
Urban Affairs Review 32, no. 4 (March 1, 1997): 459–89. 
25 Ibid. 




and become an institutionalized part of neighbourhood governance.28 Tables de quartier have 
their origin in the post-renewal period, in groups that formed to coordinated the efforts of local 
actors to address problems in their neighbourhoods.29 In 1991, a similar type of multisectoral 
neighbourhood roundtable was introduced by the City in an effort to “democratise municipal 
management,” which was based on an international program called Villes et villages en santé 
(VVS), or Healthy Cities.30 The tables de quartier can be seen as positioning local actors as the 
experts on the issues of their neighbourhoods rather than privileging the expertise of professional 
planners under urban renewal.  
Scholarship on the tables de quartier rarely elaborates on their early formation and does 
not link their emergence to the physical/social legacies of renewal or to the neighbourhoods in 
which renewal was carried out. Chapter two contributes to the existing literature by examining 
the early activities of a community-led roundtable, the Little Burgundy Coalition, and the arrival 
of the VVS model at the initiative of the City. The Coalition united local community groups to 
address problems that its members connected to the effects of urban renewal. The VVS 
committee, too, united community groups to address problems in the neighbourhood. Despite 
having similar structures, the 1994 merger of the community-led Coalition with the VVS 
roundtable was a point of tension for Coalition members who worried about being coopted by 
the state. In the Coalition, the member community groups developed the action plans and 
engaged with state agencies as partners to achieve them, while in the VVS committee, state 
agencies took on a greater role in governance. My research shows how logics of community 
participation that emerged in the renewal period informed both these roundtables, and though the 
role of state agencies differed in each, both functioned to legitimate the use of state capacity.  
                                                 
28 Annick Germain, Richard Morin, and Gilles Sénécal, “L’évolution du mouvement associatif montréalais : un 
retour au territoire programmé par l’État ?,” Lien social et Politiques, no. 52 (2004): 129, doi:10.7202/010595ar; 
Laurence Bherer, “Les trois modèles municipaux de participation publique au Québec,” Télescope 17, no. 1 (2011): 
157–71; Gilles Sénécal, Geneviève Cloutier, and Patrick Herjean, “Le quartier comme espace transactionnel: 
L’expérience des Tables de concertation de quartier à Montréal,” Cahiers de géographie du Québec 52, no. 146 
(2008): 191, doi:10.7202/019588ar; Gilles Sénecal et al., “Les grands projets résidentiel au defi de la concertation de 
quartier: Le cas des Tables de quartier à Montréal,” Les annales de la recherche urbaine 106 (2010): 74–83; David 
Longtin and Juliette Rochman, Les enjeux du développement social à Montréal: évolution entre 1998 et 2014, 2015. 
29 Although some neighbourhood roundtables predate the post-renewal period, such as the roundtable in Notre Dame 
de Grâce which formed in 1942, the majority emerged in the 1980s. Gilles Sénecal et al., “Les effects de la 
concertation:  Étude sur les Tables intersectorielles de quartier de Montréal” (Montréal: Institut national de la 
recherche scientifique Centre - Urbanisation Culture Société, 2010), 4. 
30 Germain, Morin, and Sénécal, “L’évolution du mouvement associatif montréalais,” 131. 
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 The literature shows that some community members involved in post-renewal politics 
considered the possibility of controlled, socially-sensitive forms of gentrification as a strategy to 
transform their severely distressed neighbourhoods in the post-renewal period. In her study of the 
revitalization of the South Bronx, Catherine Guimond has suggested that the more influence 
local community members had in revitalization efforts, the less it would resemble the negative 
aspects of gentrification.31 This claim seems to be supported by Owens’ account of the 
Community Development Corporation in South Jamaica, which was able to avoid displacement 
of low-income residents while pursuing an explicit agenda to attract middle-income families and 
increase homeownership by ensuring affordable housing was being constructed simultaneously.32 
Similarly, in Hochelaga, community organizations hoping to improve the conditions of the 
neighbourhood realized their strategy was essentially to induce gentrification, but were also 
vigilant to include affordable housing options in development.33 Sternberg and Anderson also 
described the efforts of a coalition made up of Black middle-class homeowners to revitalize 
Bronzeville, known as Chicago’s historic ‘Black Metropolis.’34 The coalition’s goals aligned 
with the pro-gentrification agenda of the City and they partnered with city programs to achieve 
their goals. This group was not opposed to gentrification as long as the benefits went to the Black 
community rather than the speculative investors whose history of racial discrimination was at the 
root of the neighbourhood’s disinvestment in the first place. However, the authors warned that 
the Black community was fractured along class lines which resulted in the interests of lower-
class African Americans being marginalized in the revival of the Black Metropolis. The parallel 
existence of the Coalition and the VVS committee described in chapter two shows that even 
groups with virtually identical objectives and structures can hold different and sometimes 
conflicting ideas about local governance depending on which actors are in positions of 
leadership. In a similar vein, in chapter four I describe how the police were seen as partners in 
addressing criminality and insecurity, but also as a source of insecurity for some residents. These 
                                                 
31 Catherine Claire Guimond, “Battle for the Bronx: Neighborhood Revitalization in a Gentrifying City” (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of California, 2013). 
32 Owens, “Renewal in a Working-Class Black Neighborhood.” 
33 Annick Germain, Damaris Rose, and Amy Twigge-Molecey, “Mixité sociale ou inclusion sociale ? Bricolages 
montréalais pour un jeu à acteurs multiples,” Espaces et sociétés 140–141, no. 1 (2010): 143. 
34 Sternberg and Anderson, “Contestation and the Local Trajectories of Neoliberal Urban Governance in Chicago’s 
Bronzeville and Pilsen.” 
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contrasting understandings of the police led to different approaches to addressing the conditions 
of insecurity in the Little Burgundy.       
Concentration of Poverty and Social Mix 
A third theme in the literature concerns the social conditions produced by renewal and the logics 
of neighbourhood action that emerged to address these conditions. Large-scale construction of 
low-income public housing was one of the legacies that many urban renewal programs shared, 
and problems arising from the perceived ‘concentration of poverty’ that resulted were among the 
issues with which subsequent forms of urban governance would attend.  Urban renewal was used 
to realize modernist architectural forms such as the rational, high-rise buildings which had been 
advanced as solutions to the congested, disorderly, and morally-deprived slums they would 
replace. Pursuit of these ideals physically and socially transformed urban landscapes by 
expropriating land into public ownership, building housing at high densities and designating this 
housing to low-income occupants. Although areas identified as ‘slums’ had been cleared to 
construct these projects on the premise that the deprived living conditions reproduced poverty 
like a disease or contagion, somehow the new modern dwellings did not improve the social 
issues of the urban poor. Instead the signs of social disintegration, such as unemployment, 
single-parent families, vandalism, and drug use, only continued.  
Seeking an explanation for the social conditions that only seemed to worsen in inner 
cities in the post-renewal period led W. J. Wilson to develop the concept of spatially 
concentrated poverty.35 While Wilson’s concept of a concentration of poverty was meant to 
encompass complex processes that included economic restructuring, migration, demographic 
changes, and social norms, Crump has argued that the term quickly became a catchphrase 
through which the spatial concentration of poverty was seen as the cause of social issues rather 
than a symptom.36 For policy makers, framing a concentration of poverty as the root of inner-city 
problems “provided legitimacy for a wide range of policies that explicitly aim to deconcentrate 
                                                 
35 William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
36 Jeff Crump, “Deconcentration by Demolition: Public Housing, Poverty, and Urban Policy,” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 20, no. 5 (October 2002): 581–96. 
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poverty by reorganizing the spatial structure of the city” rather than addressing the actual causes 
of poverty or social issues.37  
Inducing this demographic redistribution was justified by both social and economic 
logics which built upon a long history of viewing social mix as a corrective to social ills, an idea 
that had been building since the early 1800s.38 In the post-renewal period, the main social logic 
was based on the idea that middle-class neighbours would model behaviour that could serve as 
an example to the lower-class who were ostensibly trapped in the culture of concentrated poverty 
(created, in part, by renewal). This logic was paired with an economic logic that sought to 
address the lack of property tax revenues in low-income areas which constrained cities in their 
ability to provide municipal services. Under both logics, establishing a better socioeconomic 
balance was argued to benefit low-income populations through the improvements to their living 
environments and the increased social mobility through their new behaviours and access to 
resources.39 The concentration of poverty framing and social mix solution provided a benevolent 
justification for further rounds of displacement and a new process of gentrification. 
Public housing, however, served as an obstacle to displacement, at least initially. This 
form of housing was subject to different legal and property systems which effectively locked in 
low-income populations and locked out private speculation and development. Special 
programming was thus required to release this land into that property ecosystem. For the public 
housing complexes created by urban renewal, the most significant social mix policy was the 
HOPE VI program in the United States. Launched in 1994, HOPE VI provided federal funding 
to demolish public housing and rebuild the areas with mixed-income developments through 
public-private partnerships in order to achieve a more desirable social mix. The redevelopment 
of public housing promoted through HOPE VI would become a model for cities beyond the 
United States, including Toronto’s Regent Park.40 Managing the socioeconomic balance under 
HOPE VI was achieved by building new housing of different tenure types throughout the 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 584. 
38 Wendy Sarkissian, “The Idea of Social Mix in Town Planning: An Historical Review,” Urban Studies 13 (1976): 
231–46. 
39 Crump, “Deconcentration by Demolition”; L. Lees, “Gentrification and Social Mixing: Towards an Inclusive 
Urban Renaissance?” Urban Studies 45, no. 12 (November 1, 2008): 2449–70. 
40 Martine August, “Challenging the Rhetoric of Stigmatization: The Benefits of Concentrated Poverty in Toronto’s 
Regent Park,” Environment and Planning A 46, no. 6 (2014): 1317–33, doi:10.1068/a45635; August, “It’s All about 
Power and You Have None”; August, “Revitalisation Gone Wrong”; James, “From ‘slum Clearance’ to 
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neighbourhood, including some public housing, private marking rentals, and options for 
homeownership.  
Social mix has been criticized by scholars and others who argue that simply managing 
socioeconomic spatial distribution does nothing to address the root causes of poverty.41 Many 
analyses of the interventions to deconcentrate poverty of public housing through redevelopment 
projects point out how these interventions set the stage for gentrification.42 Portraying a low-
income area as problematic can be used to justify redevelopment or other interventions through a 
concentration of poverty logic, even if these representations had little in common with the 
realities in the neighbourhood. Martine August showed that in Regent Park, in line with the 
findings of many other studies, the City and media argued that redevelopment was necessary by 
portraying the area as one overwhelmed with problems that did not necessarily correspond with 
the lived experience of the residents, but were rather carefully constructed images of social 
pathology.43 August argued that through these images, cities gained license to make dramatic 
interventions in the name of social mix, including public housing demolition and redevelopment, 
even when the needs of residents may have been addressed through interventions that did not 
require demolition or displacement.  
Studies have reported mixed findings about the impacts of these public housing 
redevelopment initiatives and whether the poor actually benefit from social mix policies.44 James 
Hanlon investigated the claim that by deconcentrating poverty HOPE VI improved conditions for 
the former tenants in his study of the program in Louisville, Kentucky which was celebrated as a 
success story of the program.45 Though the demographic information available for the census 
area did show a greater socioeconomic diversity after the HOPE VI project was completed, 
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Hanlon noted that, given the net-loss of public housing units, the low-income residents were 
deconcentrated through displacement rather than dilution. The partial data available to track 
former residents suggested that displaced households moved to areas with the highest rates of 
unemployment in the city, consequently increasing the concentration of poverty elsewhere. 
Social mix was also used to address problems linked to undesirably high rates of poverty 
in neighbourhoods that did not have public housing. Different methods of governance were 
required to regulate the sociodemographic distribution of people living in private rentals, 
however. Slater described a formerly affluent neighbourhood in Toronto which became low-
income following the construction of an expressway as part of an urban renewal program.46  
Proximity to a psychiatric hospital and affordable rents due to disinvestment after the 
expressway arrived led to a large number of residents struggling with mental health and 
addiction problems. In this case, the City connected the levels of moral deviance and crime to the 
high proportion of single-occupancy dwellings in the neighbourhood. They addressed this 
concentration of poverty with a moratorium on this housing type and stricter enforcement of 
building regulations. Meanwhile, they encouraged the construction or conversion of larger units 
in order to attract families, whose presence was seen as stabilizing, to the neighbourhood. 
Though the particularities of this neighbourhood differed from those with large public housing 
projects, it exhibits similarities to the urban governance used in HOPE VI, namely by managing 
demographic composition through housing type and availability. In this example, rather than 
public-private development projects, the City used regulatory tools and it adjusted demographics 
through unit size rather than tenure type.  
In Montreal, studies of social mix have focused on quite different attempts at creating 
social-mix. In the efforts studied, social mix provided a logic, not to deconcentrate poverty and 
demolish public housing, but rather to promote the inclusion of low-income housing in new 
developments. This is was the focus of Germain, Rose and Twigge-Molencey’s study in 
Hochelaga, Montreal.47 Community groups there recognised that the new dwellings created by a 
public-private partnership would only be accessible to homeowners and would categorically 
exclude the working-class and low-income residents that made up the majority of the 
neighbourhood. Using a rhetoric of social mix, these groups pushed for a diversity of tenure-
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types in the project, including cooperative and low-income housing. One important difference 
between this case and the public housing redevelopment programs such as HOPE VI is that the 
Hochelaga development was on a brownfield site, so there was no need to “free” public land into 
the private markets. It exhibited, nevertheless, the logic of neighbourhood action often deployed 
in post-renewal neighbourhoods: a logic of social mix. 
In the case of post-renewal Little Burgundy, my research reveals that the ways 
concentrated poverty and social mix were part of (or absent from) efforts to manage the 
sociodemographics of the neighbourhood run counter to the ways they are generally presented in 
the literature. Chapter three offers new perspectives to this theme in the literature. A closer look 
at an important housing initiative by the City to attract a middle-income population reveals that, 
contrary to appearances, it was not motivated by concerns about the high rates of poverty in the 
neighbourhood. For some local community organizations who provided services to the poor, 
however, a concentration of poverty had benefits for them to accomplish their work, and they 
saw the increasing homeowner population as a threat. This perspective represents a reversal of 
the views on concentrated poverty generally presented in the literature, in which it tends to be 
framed as a problem. It is more in keeping with Martine August’s effort to expand this narrative 
to include the advantages that such concentrations can also provide.48  
The instances from Little Burgundy that do frame concentrated poverty as a problem also 
differ from the general literature. Rather than emerging after renewal, for example, concerns 
about concentrated poverty were already being articulated by Little Burgundy’s citizen 
committees at the onset of the renewal period. These views informed legal and administrative 
structures that enabled the housing office to maintain a social mix in public housing early in the 
post-renewal period. Only after these mechanisms were removed do we see the problems of the 
neighbourhood being attributed to a concentration of poverty by some actors, the public housing 
office amongst them. The housing office responded to this problem with various initiatives, some 
more successful than others. One of these attempts resembled HOPE VI in that it aimed to 
reduce the number of public housing units and add housing options for households of higher 
income levels. It did so not through redevelopment but by changing the property mode of the 
existing units. Though such a solution may seem simple compared to a vast demolition-
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rebuilding program such as HOPE VI, the housing office’s initiative in Little Burgundy failed 
while HOPE VI was widely adopted.  
Finally, with limited means to address the problems of insecurity related to the drug trade 
in its properties, the housing office used a strategy of eviction and a moratorium on renting to 
displace unwanted tenants and reduce the (extremely low-income) public housing population. 
This strategy relied on a collaboration with the police to supply evidence needed to justify the 
evictions, but one advantage was the burden of proof was less stringent in civil law of the rental 
board compared with criminal courts. I describe the policing aspects of this collaboration in 
chapter four, but in terms of the concentration of poverty thesis, I observe that the preponderance 
of public housing in Little Burgundy allowed this mode of governance to be applied across the 
neighbourhood. Predominantly low-income neighbourhoods were not limited to those with a 
high proportion of public housing, of course, but the predominance of a single cooperative 
landlord, rather than multiple disinterested private slumlords, facilitated this strategy to displace 
tenants who were considered a problem.   
Discussion 
Aside from the public housing redevelopment programs such as HOPE VI, few of the studies 
discussed above deal directly with the legacies of urban renewal and the urban governance that 
emerged to address it. Nonetheless, this literature shows that a popular understanding of urban 
renewal as having failed contributed to the delegitimization of certain forms of urban governance 
and constrained the responses that could be mobilized to respond to these challenges, especially 
in the United States. Top-down, expert- and state-led projects became particularly unviable. This 
corresponded with a shift from Keynesian to neoliberal ideology in Western governments more 
broadly, and although the extent to which this was a cause or effect (or both) has been discussed 
at length by Klemek, it will probably never be decided conclusively. 
The wake of urban renewal’s failure left Western cities with a crisis of ‘state capacity,’ as 
government-led planning initiatives became politically unviable.49 Ruth Gilmore refers to state 
capacity as the “fiscal, institutional and ideological means” available to the state, which took the 
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form of the welfare state in response to the Great Depression.50 During the same period that 
urban renewal was being called into question, Keynesian welfare programs were also being 
delegitimized. Yet, as Gilmore notes, “the state did not disappear… Rather, what withered was 
the state’s legitimacy to act as the Keynesian state.”51 Gilmore illustrates how this surplus (no 
longer legitimate, but still extant) state capacity was reconfigured and deployed in the prison 
industrial complex in California throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
The failure of urban renewal, the literature suggests, contributed to this surplus capacity 
by delegitimizing state-led social programs in general. Surplus state capacity was, at least 
partially, a legacy of urban renewal. Following Gilmore in her tracing of connections between 
legitimacy and state capacity can, I think, be a productive way of thinking through the 
constraints on urban governance in the post-renewal period. Through this literature we have seen 
that delegitimized state capacity and a lack of available alternative policies for managing urban 
conditions meant that private development (and abandonment) was left unchecked until this 
surplus state capacity could be reconfigured in a politically viable mode; that is, one supported 
by the legitimacy of the rising neoliberal ideology. The ways this surplus state capacity would be 
reanimated were dependent on the conditions of the areas being governed, including the legacies 
of urban renewal programs.  
Though using state capacity in a leading role in urban governance had become unviable, 
the literature – and my own research – suggests that partnerships with private developers and 
community organizations lent legitimacy to the use of local as well as federal government 
programs, policies, regulations, grants, institutions, and so on. Renewal, in effect, created the 
conditions in which this specific form of governance became viable. Acting through partnerships 
was a new form of governance in some ways. How fully it departed from the renewal ‘order,’ 
however, is unclear. Indeed, despite the popular consensus of urban renewal’s failure and 
Klemek’s claims that its mechanisms had lost legitimacy, Derek Hyra has called the forms of 
urban governance that predominated from 1994-2007 a “New Urban Renewal” due to 
similarities with the earlier version of the mid-century: the massive federal funding and large-
scale architectural fix to urban social problems predicated on displacement.52 The ‘new’ urban 
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renewal seems to have carried out similar actions through a different form of legitimacy, a form 
of legitimacy regained through public-private partnerships and community consultations and 
participation, as the HOPE VI redevelopment projects demonstrate.  
The rise of public-private partnerships contributed to David Harvey’s seminal claim that 
the main difference in urban governance in the post-renewal period was the speculative nature of 
the projects that local governments undertook.53 Whereas until that point government had played 
more of a managerial role in executing projects, such as those of urban renewal, the post-renewal 
period saw governments increasingly involved in public-private partnerships in which they 
subsumed much of the risk that would otherwise be sustained by private developers in a bid for 
any kind of reprieve from the recession. These projects were rarely designed to benefit the poor 
except through the potential, much-anticipated spill-over effects of attracting capital. In 
combination with public-private partnerships, local governments also shouldered risk through 
tax-increment financing in which they could borrow for development projects against the 
anticipated increase in property taxes in the target area.54  
These authors clearly situate new forms of governance in the post-renewal period. They 
do not, however, link these forms of governance to the particular physical and social legacies of 
renewal. State capacity in Little Burgundy was employed through partnerships with community 
organizations to address conditions created by urban renewal. The Coalition made demands of 
state agencies such as the housing office and the police in order to pursue the action plans that 
the community had developed to address the conditions left by renewal. In the same period, the 
City was developing its own initiative to incorporate community participation in neighbourhood 
development and planning based on ideals that had entered municipal politics through the 
contestation of urban renewal. Animating state capacity through community participation came 
from both bottom-up and top-down initiatives that were shaped by renewal.  
Forms of urban governance which emerged in response to what was considered 
unacceptably high concentrations of poverty are more closely linked to the physical and social 
legacies of renewal. Efforts to create an appropriate social mix might attempt to attract more 
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homeowners or decrease the low-income population. Some uses of state capacity to achieve 
social mix were put in place without the need for accompanying legitimization, such as in 
Slater’s example of using regulatory tools to control private housing unit sizes to reduce the 
availability of rental stock for single, and often low-income, residents.55 This was a more passive 
form of governance than the redevelopment of large public housing complexes, in which 
governments actively displaced residents and demolished buildings. Both public-private 
partnerships and community participation were indispensable to legitimizing this active use of 
state capacity here, perhaps because, as Hyra identified, it closely resembled the urban renewal 
process that had generated much of the public housing in the first place. Sociodemographic 
governance in post-renewal Little Burgundy, as I have indicated, offers new perspectives to this 
literature on how ideas about concentrated poverty and social mix related to the physical, social, 
and ideological legacies renewal.   
Considering the very high profile place of crime in the discourse around urban issues 
since the 1960s, policing is conspicuously absent from the urban governance articles surveyed 
here.56 Elizabeth Hinton has placed the disinvestment of community organizations in the United 
States, to which Klemek attributed the weakening of community-led alternatives to renewal, into 
context of a political project that shifted away from programs designed to address poverty and 
instead toward policies that policed and contained it.57 This included using police to provide 
services offered by community groups and social non-profits, such as supervising youth activity 
centres or helping illiterate citizens fill out government paperwork, but with the objective of 
gaining greater cooperation of citizens with the police.58 The creation of stronger police-
community links in the 1960s and 70s has been documented by other scholars but Hinton’s work 
makes it possible see some of the connections with post-renewal neighbourhoods.59   
A second study which did mention policing was explicit about its role in urban 
governance, if less so about the legacies of urban renewal. Edward Goetz, better known for his 
                                                 
55 Slater, “Municipally Managed Gentrification in South Parkdale, Toronto.” 
56 The relative absence of the role of police in urban governance in this literature may be attributed to the sampling 
method, which may have missed relevant articles on policing in post-renewal neighbourhoods. For example, I did 
not include articles on managing crime and security in public housing, though the majority of public housing in the 
United States is a legacy of urban renewal. 
57 Elizabeth Kai Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
58 Ibid., 114. 
59 Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Craig Gilmore, “Beyond Bratton,” in Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led 
to Black Lives Matter, ed. Christina Heatherton and Jordan Camp (London: Verso, 2015), 173–200. 
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academic work on public housing, argued that the lack of a coherent federal urban policy was a 
void that was filled by the war on drugs.60 Using examples from a study in Minneapolis, he 
illustrated this claim by describing the cooperation of municipal housing inspectors in police 
drug raids to evict tenants and the role of police in organizing property managers to identify 
potential ‘bad tenants’ and share information about tenants they had evicted. These two existing 
works by Hinton and Goetz fill an important void, but leave many questions unaddressed. Did 
the actors who promoted these new forms of policing tie their arguments to the conditions of 
post-renewal neighbourhoods? Did the physical and/or social conditions of post-renewal 
neighbourhoods create challenges for existing forms of policing that some actors felt needed to 
be overcome? What role, if any, did community actors, community participation, and/or public-
private partnerships have in the rise of these forms of policing? To what extent, if at all, were 
these forms of policing related to the “social mix” that was then being promoted? 
Addressing the paucity of research on the relationship between the new forms of policing 
that emerged in the 1960s and 70s and the legacies of urban renewal is one of the clearest 
contributions of the present thesis. I show that increasing police violence and police harassment 
was one of the sources of insecurity that community organizations attempted to address, and 
their mobilization and protests on this issue contributed to the turn toward community engaged 
approaches to policing. Although police harassment itself was not directly shaped by renewal 
legacies, renewal’s role in weakening the social fabric of the neighbourhood was an important 
logic through which criminality and insecurity in the neighbourhood were understood. Framed in 
this way, two post-renewal policing programs that incorporated community development were 
deployed in Little Burgundy insecurity problems. Finally, as with the partnership between 
municipal inspectors and police that Goetz described, the public housing office and police 
collaborated to evict unwanted tenants facilitated police work. As mentioned above, the high 
proportion of public housing in the neighbourhood, a result of renewal, helped this strategy play 
an important role in addressing the crack crisis.  
                                                 
60 Edward G. Goetz, “The US War on Drugs as Urban Policy,” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 20, no. 3 (September 1996): 539–49. 
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1.2 Post-renewal urban governance in Little Burgundy 
This thesis builds on the literature reviewed here through an historical study of post-renewal 
governance in Little Burgundy, a Montreal neighbourhood subjected to an urban renewal 
program. Between 1965, when the program was announced, and 1978, when the last phase 
ended, this pericentral industrial working-class neighbourhood was dramatically transformed. 
The questions that I seek to answer in this work are the following:  
- How have the physical, social and ideological legacies of urban renewal shaped the 
development of these neighbourhoods?   
- How did citizens, governments or other actors attempt to transform the conditions of 
their neighbourhood that resulted from urban renewal?  
- What new logics of neighbourhood action did these efforts produce?  
Chapter two discusses the delegitimization of top-down planning and the rise of 
community participation in urban governance between the renewal and post-renewal period. 
Citizen committees in Little Burgundy contested the renewal program developed by experts in 
the planning department, calling into question the legitimacy of this form of planning and 
helping bring a new ideal of community participation in neighbourhood development into the 
political agenda. In the post-renewal period, this ideological legacy was put in to practice by both 
citizen and state initiatives, the Little Burgundy Coalition and the municipal program Vivre 
Montréal en santé (VMS). I argue that the logic of community participation did not preclude 
state involvement, but community involvement facilitated the use of state capacity regardless of 
whether the initiatives originated from the community or the state.   
In chapter three, I explore the notion of concentrated poverty as a problem and social mix 
as a solution through the lens of sociodemographic governance, presenting alternative findings to 
those generally found in the literature. Already in the renewal period, citizens feared that the new 
public housing would become a “ghetto” of the extremely poor, and the rent scale they 
developed to address these concerns provided the basis for the legal and administrative 
mechanisms that the housing office used to maintain a social mix in its properties into the post-
renewal period. It was only after changes to the laws removed these mechanisms that the housing 
office began to identify problems in the neighbourhood as consequences of concentrated poverty, 
but its means to address this problem were limited. Evictions were one of the few tools 
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remaining to it, which were used strategically in cooperation with the police in response to the 
crack crisis. Also in the post-renewal period, the City launched the programs Operation 10,000 
and 20,000 Logements, which changed the sociodemographic balance in the neighbourhood by 
significantly increasing the home-owning population in an attempt to overcome the failure of 
renewal to attract private residential development. 
Observations about the role of the police in post-renewal governance is discussed in 
chapter four. The main changes to policing in this period were increasing levels of police 
violence and harassment toward Black residents and the emergence of the efforts to incorporate 
neighbourhood communities into the management of criminality and security. Although renewal 
legacies can only be a partial explanation for policing practices in this period, and some practices 
may have had little to do with renewal, I show how three legacies of renewal shaped the forms of 
policing in the neighbourhood. First, I describe how the idea of a weakened social fabric was part 
of the logic for two programs applied to Little Burgundy, Tandem and ACES, both of which 
relied on the involvement of communities and citizens in the practice of policing. Second, I draw 
connections between policing and the unfulfilled promise of development, left by renewal in 
Little Burgundy’s physical landscape as its vacant lots. Finally, the abundance of public housing 
constructed during urban renewal made the public housing office the single major landlord of the 
neighbourhood, and one in which the police found a cooperative partner in managing criminality 
across the neighbourhood. I show how, through a strategy of eviction and moratorium on renting, 
the public housing office and police collaborated to displace tenants considered to be causing 
problems by using police evidence in civil courts of the rental board. 
In the conclusion, I summarize my findings and show how they contribute to the themes 
of the literature. Urban renewal cannot be credited with shaping all the neighbourhood conditions 
and the forms of governance discussed in this thesis alone, and certainly some had little to do 
with renewal at all. Nonetheless, tracing these connections has helped distinguish the logics of 
these actions. In short, this study shows that the effects of urban renewal extended beyond the 
transformations of the renewal period, but instead continued to shape the ways community 
participation, sociodemographic management, and policing were part of urban governance in 
Little Burgundy even after renewal itself had ended. 
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1.3 Research methods 
I addressed my research questions through an historical study of Little Burgundy, focused on the 
post-renewal period from 1979 to 1995, but which also engages with the renewal period (1965–
1978) to establish the connections between renewal legacies and post-renewal governance. This 
research is based on archival records, as well as other sources such as reports, newspapers and 
scholarly publications. The sources consulted are outlined in the sections below. Through these 
records one can only present a partial representation of the period, and as such this study should 
be considered the groundwork for future research which should include interviews with 
participants, many of whom are still active in the neighbourhood.  
Renewal period 
The renewal period itself is not the focus of this research, but in order to understand its physical, 
social and ideological legacies I consulted various primary and secondary sources related to this 
period. The most thorough reference for urban renewal in Little Burgundy is the doctoral 
dissertation of Robert Mayer.61 Other graduate theses provided insight into the implementation 
of the renewal program and the activities of the citizen committees.62 For the citizen committees, 
I consulted the records of the social animators in the Southwest, including articles and reports by 
Conseil des oeuvres animators Michel Blondin and Hector Ouellet,63 reports by the Company of 
Young Canadians,64 documents from the Montreal Council of Social Agencies65 and academic 
writing on these groups and individuals.66 The activities and views of the Saint Martin’s Blocks 
                                                 
61 Two volumes weighing 15lbs, Mayer’s dissertation can be called the Bible of Little Burgundy’s urban renewal 
program. Mayer, “L’idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec et à Montréal.” 
62 Piotte, “La rénovation urbaine et le phénomène de pression: étude monographique, le cas de la Petite Bourgogne”; 
Lavigne, “La comité de citoyens de la petite Bourgogne.” 
63 Michel Blondin, “L’animation sociale en milieu urbain : une solution,” Recherches sociographiques 6, no. 3 
(1965): 283, doi:10.7202/055279ar; Michel Blondin, “Vie urbaine et animation sociale,” Recherches 
sociographiques 9, no. 1–2 (1968): 111, doi:10.7202/055396ar; Michel Blondin, Hector Ouellet, and Robert 
Chagnon, “Rélogement des familles expropriées: Ilôts-St-Martin - première étape du projet de rénovation urbaine du 
secteur ‘Petite Bourgogne,’” March 1967; Hector Ouellet, “L’animation sociale à Montréal ; Elements du 
programme de travail 1966-1967” (Montréal: Conseil des oeuvres de Montréal, November 1966), F013 HA04170 
File 9, Concordia Library Special Collections. 
64 Suzanne Veit, “La participation des citoyens et la Compagnie des Jeunes Canadiens en 1971 : Trois études de cas” 
(Compagnie des Jeunes Canadiens, August 1971); “Rapport sur le développement du projet Petite Bourgogne, 
présenté au ‘Comité intérimaire des programmes’ de la C.J.C.,” May 31, 1968. 
65 Montreal Council of Social Agencies, MG 2076 44 File 00779, McGill University Archives. 
66 Vincent Garneau, “Le Conseil des œuvres de Montréal : animation sociale, démocratie participative et 
affrontement politique” (Master’s Thesis, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2011); Martin Croteau, “L’implication 
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Committee (SMBC) come across in an article by its president Jeanne LeBlanc,67 in the NFB film 
La P’tite Bourgogne,68 and in documents preserved in the archives of the Negro Community 
Centre (NCC).69 I also referred to studies and reports on the renewal program from the urban 
planning and housing departments.70 The biography of Guy Legault, former director of the 
planning department, the housing department and the OMHM, provided a perspective from these 
municipal and paramunicipal agencies.71 
Post-renewal governance 
In the post-renewal period, I looked at the actors, policies and practices that seemed to reflect the 
four themes retained from the literature. For insight into the general logics of urban governance 
from the City, I consulted the Montreal’s urban planning and development Master Plan, and the 
Directive Plan for the Southwest borough, as well as for Ville-Marie.72 I also consulted the 
archival documents of the public consultations for the Master Plan in the Southwest.73   
Community participation  
My major sources for the activities of the Little Burgundy Coalition were meeting minutes and 
letters held in the archives of the Negro Community Centre.74 These convey the objectives of the 
Coalition, action plans of some of its committees, and provide snapshots of the actors and 
                                                                                                                                                             
sociale et politique de Jacques Couture à Montréal de 1963 à 1976” (Master’s Thesis, Université du Québec à 
Montréal, 2008). 
67 Jeanne Leblanc, “La lutte des citoyens des Îlots St-Martin,” in Petite Bourgogne, Les Gens du Québec 2 
(Montréal: Éditions québécoises, 1973), 46–57. 
68 Maurice Bulbulian, La P’tite Bourgogne, Documentaire (ONF, 1968), 
https://www.onf.ca/film/la_ptite_bourgogne. Also available in English but with a shorter runtime. 
69 Saint-Martin’s Blocks Committee, “Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal),” 1968, F013 HA04170 
File 3, Concordia Library Special Collections; Saint-Martin’s Blocks Committee, “St-Martin Blocks Bulletin Vol 1 
Issue 1,” December 1967, F013 HA04173 File 44, Concordia Library Special Collections. The NCC fonds also has 
documents from the citizen committee Réveil and the Little Burgundy Council.  
70 Montréal : Service d’urbanisme, “La Petite Bourgogne: Bulletin Spécial no. 1” (Montréal: Ville de Montréal, 
1965), VM097-Z_025op, Archives de la Ville de Montréal; Montréal : Service d’urbanisme, “La Petite Bourgogne: 
Rapport Général” (Montréal: Ville de Montréal, 1966), Archives de la Ville de Montréal; Montréal : Service de 
l’habitation, “Les Habitations des Îlots Saint-Martin” (Montreal: Ville de Montréal, 1968). 
71 Guy R. Legault, La ville qu’on a bâtie: trente ans au service de l’urbanisme et de l’habitation à Montréal, 1956-
1986 (Montréal: Liber, 2002). 
72 Montréal : Service de l’habitation et du développement urbain, Réussir Montréal : plan d’urbanisme (Ville de 
Montréal, 1992); Montréal : Service de l’habitation et du développement urbain, Plan d’urbanisme : plan directeur 
de l’arrondissement Sud-ouest (Ville de Montréal, 1992); Montréal : Bureau du plan d’urbanisme, Master 
Development Plan for the Ville-Marie District (Ville de Montréal, 1990). 
73 CA M001 VM049-12-D08, Archives de la Ville de Montréal. 
74 Negro Community Centre / Charles H. Este Cultural Centre fonds F013 HA04193 File 4; F013 HA04151 File 21, 
File 24; F013 HA04212 File 1, File 2, Concordia University Library, Special Collections. 
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activities. A chapter on Little Burgundy by Annick Germain and collaborators in a volume on 
interethnic cohabitation in Montreal neighbourhoods paints a detailed portrait of the 
neighbourhood in the first half of the 1990s, with some useful observations about the Coalition.75  
The OMHM’s bulletin Le Nid ran articles on the Coalition as well as housing office’s initiative 
to support community development in response.76 Certain oral history collections pertain to 
Little Burgundy and the post-renewal period, and though I consulted these they did not 
contribute significantly to this research.77   
For the program Vivre Montréal en santé (VMS), a variety of documents and reports are 
available at the Marie-Morin documentation centre.78 I also consulted records on file at the 
municipal archives.79   
Concentration of poverty and social mix 
Chapter three describes how ideas about concentration of poverty and social mix were part of the 
legacies that shaped how the actors in the neighbourhood approached the issues of the post-
renewal period.  In the post-renewal period, the municipal housing office (OMHM) was the main 
actor whose actions were shaped by this idea. Social mix and concentration of poverty informed 
the way the citizen committee designed the rents scale which allowed the housing office to 
maintain a social mix in its properties.80 When these mechanisms were overruled by changes to 
the provincial laws, the intensification of very poor residents in public housing lead to a renewed 
concern about the ill effects of a concentration of poverty.   
                                                 
75 Annick Germain, Jean-François Marchand, and Édith Mukakayumba, “La Petite-Bourgogne : un quartier 
tourmenté à la reconquête de son image,” in Cohabitation interethnique et vie de quartier, études et recherches 12 
(Montréal: INRS-Urbanisation, 1995), 169–200. 
76 “Petite-Bourgogne, certifiée prioritaire,” Le Nid: Bulletin de l’OMHM, August 1991; Yves Sauvé, “Un géant dans 
la Petite-Bourgogne,” Le Nid: Bulletin de l’OMHM, June 1991; “Les Ados: Dans l’ouest de la ville,” Le Nid: 
Bulletin de l’OMHM, October 1991; “Dossier: Pour l’O.M.H.M., la Petite-Bourgogne, c’est toujours... certifiée 
prioritaire,” Le Nid: Bulletin de l’OMHM, February 1992; “Les Îlots St-Martin font parler d’eux,” Le Nid: Bulletin 
de l’OMHM, September 1993. 
77 Little Burgundy Oral History Project (1981-2), P007 Oral History-Montreal Studies collection, Concordia 
University Records Management and Archives; COHDS-05-001 Voices of Little Burgundy, COHDS-10-048 Alfie 
Roberts Institute fonds, Centre for Oral History and Digital Storytelling. 
78 Montréal: Service des loisirs et du développement communautaire, “Adhesion de la Ville de Montréal au Réseau 
québecois de villes et villages en santé ‘Vivre Montréal en santé’” (Ville de Montréal, January 1990); Murielle 
Leduc, “Vivre Montréal en santé: Une première évaluation,” October 20, 1993; Danielle de Connick, “Réflexion sur 
les indicateurs dans le cadre du projet de «Vivre Montréal en santé (VMS)»” (Montréal: Division des analyses 
d’impacts, Module de la recherche et de la planification, Service de la planification et de la concertation, December 
10, 1990); “À Thomas Chapais, la santé, ça compte!,” Le Nid: Bulletin de l’OMHM, September 1989. 
79 CA M001 P077-0-D309, Archives de la Ville de Montréal. 
80 Saint-Martin’s Blocks Committee, “Brief Concerning New Houses (Rent Scale Proposal).” 
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The role of the OMHM in Little Burgundy during the crack crisis is told in its 
retrospective history and in accounts by its former staff and municipal housing officials.81 It can 
also be traced through newspaper articles and their own annual reports, although reports were not 
published for most of the 1980s. Finally, I have recuperated some of the eviction case decisions 
that went before the rental board (Régie du logement), either published in jurisprudence reporters 
or used as jurisprudence in cases on file at the Cour du Québec. These cases provide insight into 
the rationale of the housing office. Though I have also obtained data of cases taken to the Régie 
by the OMHM for the years 1985-1995, unfortunately the motive of the eviction cases cannot be 
determined from this data and only 3% of the original cases have been preserved in the archival 
process.82 One of the OMHM’s initiatives to retain the wage-earning families at Îlots Saint-
Martin aimed to transfer some of the public housing units from Îlots Saint-Martin into a 
cooperative housing model, and the master’s project of Éléni Reed includes a report on this 
topic.83    
For the programs Opération 10,000/20,000 Logements I consulted the phase reports from 
1979- 1986, available at the Marie Morin documentation centre, as well as evaluations of the 
program.84 This program was continued under Doré as Habiter Montréal, and although I 
consulted the phase reports for these (also at Marie Morin), Little Burgundy did not feature in 
them.85 
Policing 
After many, many access to information requests, the majority of my sources on policing are 
secondary, with the exception of some files in the NCC archives. Newspapers are an important 
                                                 
81 Legault, La ville qu’on a bâtie; Mackrous, “Le développement social à partir de l’habitat”; Office municipal 
d’habitation de Montréal, Mieux loger les Montréalais; Norman Daoust, “Letter from Norman Daoust to Robert 
Gagnon,” March 7, 1995, 2008-0024.01.05.219 15 25 A, McGill University Archives. 
82 OMHM data from the Régie du logement, personal communication, July 24, 2016. Archived decisions at E34 
Fonds Régie du logement, Bureau de Montréal-SudOuest (34) – Décisions, 2010-10-004/5, 2010-10-004/12, 2010-
10-004/19, 2010-10-004/20, BAnQ Vieux-Montréal. 
83 Reed, “Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin.” 
84 Ian MacBurnie, “Inner-City Housing through the Partnership Approach: An Evaluation of Three Initiatives,” 
1988; Lacroix, “Analyse de l’Opération 20,000 logements de la Ville de Montréal et de ses principales réalisations.” 
(Master’s thesis, School of Urban Planning, McGill University, 1989); Montréal : Service de l’habitation et du 
développement urbain, “Opération 20,000 logements : son bilan,” Cahier d’étude en habitation (Montréal: Ville de 
Montréal, January 1988). 
85 There was only one lot in Little Burgundy offered through this program. Montréal : Service de l’habitation et du 
développement urbain, “Habiter Montréal : Phase II,” Habiter Montréal : Programme de développement résidentiel 
(Ville de Montréal, 1993).  
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source but, as Janin Hadlaw has shown, news reporting is not neutral.86 Hadlaw’s master’s thesis 
provides an excellent analysis of how the coverage of police racism by the English media in 
Montreal constructed Little Burgundy, already spatially coded as Black, as a site of criminality 
and crisis which legitimized policing transgressions both in the neighbourhood as well as toward 
Black individuals elsewhere in the city. Her thesis includes transcripts and descriptions of the 
CBC Newswatch exposé Black & Blue, which is no longer available. The doctoral thesis by 
Daniel Desbiens, who was himself a police officer, provides insight into the community policing 
program ACES.87 This thesis contextualizes the program and quotes interviews and internal 
documents which were available to him. A letter about community relations in Little Burgundy 
from one of the officers at Station 24 is cited at length, for example. One interview provides the 
explicit rationale for starting the program in Little Burgundy rather than one of the 
neighbourhoods that had been identified as a higher priority.  
Operation Tandem, later Tandem Montreal, is a community-based crime prevention 
program that was developed in the post-renewal period and later implemented in Little Burgundy. 
I was not able to find many details about Tandem’s actions in Little Burgundy but I include a 
portrait of the program in general to give a sense of the logics behind it based on newspaper 
articles and scholarly work.88 
1.4 Limitations 
This project is presented as an archival research project. Many of my sources are published work 
by academics, such as masters or PhD theses or government reports, but as contemporary 
research they witness conditions in the neighbourhood that have historical importance. By 
combining these sources with archival materials, I hope to reconstruct a faithful approximation 
of the events that took place. But the absences in the archives were gaping, and I experienced 
                                                 
86 Hadlaw, “Locating Crisis.” 
87 Daniel Desbiens, “Opinions et attitudes des policiers face à un changement organisationnel important - 
l’implantation du programme ACES au SPVM” (Doctoral dissertation, Université de Montréal, 2002). 
88 Marie-Axelle Borde, “Pour une approche territoriale de la question de la sécurité : Le cas du programme 
communautaire Tandem dans les quartiers Hochelaga-Maisonneuve et Côte-des-Neiges à Montréal” (Master’s 
thesis, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2015); Julien Garnier, “Métro, quartiers, ville : étude de quelques 
dimensions de l’expérience quotindienne de Montréal au travers du concept foucauldien du pouvoir” (Doctoral 
dissertation, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2016); Montreal, “1982–2007: 25 années de réalisations 
remarquables en sécurité urbaine à Montréal, Tandem” (Ville de Montréal, Service du développement culturel, de la 
qualité du milieu de vie et de la diversité ethnoculturelle, 2007); Tandem Montréal, “Tandem Montréal... Déja 10 
Ans,” La Presse, October 31, 1991, sec. Publireportage. 
 30 
these as months of searching for records that I refused to believe had not been preserved.  I am 
conscious that when researching a period in living memory of its participants, interviews are a 
valuable component of historical research.  My initial research plan had included interviews. At 
one point there was potential for interviews with early members of the Coalition to be conducted 
in partnership with a parallel study on Community Participative Action Research through 
Concordia’s department of Applied Human Science at Concordia. Unfortunately, issues of 
logistics and time constraints ultimately precluded this option.  This thesis project can be thought 
of as a first stage in research that should, ideally, be extended to include interviews in a later 
stage. 
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2. Community participation in urban governance 
In 1989, Reverend Francis-Xavier called a meeting of community organizations and citizens 
interested in taking their neighbourhood back from the violent crime surrounding the drug trade 
that seemed to hold residents hostage.89 Co-director of the Tyndale St-Georges community 
centre which served the residents of Little Burgundy, Father Francis had become concerned 
about the “demonic fear” and insecurity that he observed.90 By 1990, over twenty local 
organizations, both francophone and anglophone, worked in concert as the Little Burgundy 
Coalition to change the conditions of their neighbourhood. Based on action plans they developed 
to attain their collectively defined objectives, these groups formed committees and engaged 
public agencies in their efforts to achieve their goals. In 1995, Little Burgundy was showcased at 
an international conference on crime prevention as a success story and as a model of how the 
coordinated efforts of citizens and community organizations could improve the security of their 
neighborhood in the face of criminality.91 The 46% decline in crime rates in the neighborhood 
between 1990 and 1993 was presented as evidence of the success of the local community 
coalition which formed in response to the security crisis. 
Illustrated above is a logic of neighbourhood action premised on community 
participation. This logic, central to urban governance in Little Burgundy, has its roots in a much 
earlier struggle over urban renewal in the same neighbourhood. It was in the face of urban 
renewal that local residents organized into citizen committees and, for the first time, collectively 
contested the plans of experts that were being imposed on the neighbourhood from above and 
proposed alternatives from their positions as experts on life in the neighbourhood. The political 
work of the citizen committees undermined the legitimacy of top-down planning, but it also 
introduced the notion of community-led planning as an ideal form of urban governance. This 
ideal became an important new logic of neighbourhood action, which provided an alternative to 
                                                 
89 “Minutes of Meeting Held with English Speaking Groups, June 14, 1989,” June 14, 1989, F013 HA04212 File 2, 
Concordia Library Special Collections; Martin Pelchat, “Mobilisation général contre le crack dans le Petite-
Bourgogne,” La Presse, July 9, 1990. 
90 Ingrid Peritz, “Attack on Crack; Little Burgundy Residents Work to Oust Pushers,” Gazette, July 14, 1990; Sauvé, 
“Un géant dans la Petite-Bourgogne.” 
91 Welsh and Roy, “Un habitat plus sûr.” 
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the top-down logic that guided urban renewal governance and that, due to citizens’ opposition to 
renewal, lost its legitimacy in Little Burgundy and many other cities. 
The dominance of community participation was observable in Little Burgundy in the 
mid-1980s and early 90s. It was most visibly put into action in this period when, in 1989, a 
collection of local community organizations from multiple sectors called the Little Burgundy 
Coalition collaboratively developed plans of action to address the problems in the neighbourhood 
that emerged in the wake of urban renewal. The initiatives of the Coalition were developed by 
local actors based on their experiences, reflecting the arguments the citizen committees had 
raised against top-down planning of the renewal program. This time, however, their plans were 
not in opposition to an external plan, but developed to address urgent problems in the absence of 
state action. And yet, the state was not absent from this form of governance. State institutions 
also worked in partnership with the Coalition to carry out the action plans that the community 
groups developed in matters of housing, security, youth programs and employment. In this 
arrangement, the City was able to employ its state capacity, its actions legitimized by the 
community-led plans.  
At the same time, the City had been developing ways to formalize community 
participation in the municipal urban governance system, launching its program Vivre Montréal 
en santé in 1991. Based on the international Villes et villages en santé model, the structure and 
process mirrored that of the Coalition, but tended toward greater involvement of state agencies in 
the decision-making process of neighbourhood action. Whether through partnerships with the 
Coalition or through its own initiatives, state actions were legitimized through the logic of 
community participation that had taken shape during the contestation of the citizen committees 
to urban renewal. The logic of action that emerged in response to renewal was one that centred 
community, but this community focus did not preclude the state. Regardless of whether an 
initiative originated from the community with the state as a partner, or was based on state 
objectives that then engaged community to achieve it, in each case the logic of community 
legitimized the use of state capacity. 
2.1 Urban renewal and community participation 
As I noted in the introduction, Little Burgundy was one of several areas of Montreal targeted by 
post-war urban renewal, but it was the first to face coordinated opposition from citizens. The first 
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study preparing for the renewal of the neighbourhood was announced in 1965. The 
announcement of an urban renewal program for Little Burgundy was the beginning of significant 
social and physical changes for the neighbourhood. It was also the beginning of a new form of 
community participation that eventually undermined the legitimacy of expert-led top-down 
planning and demonstrated the value of citizen involvement in developing the plans for the 
places they lived. The Little Burgundy renewal program was not the first case of urban renewal 
in Montreal, but it was the first time the expert plans from the planning department were met 
with organized contestation by the residents.92 After the actions of the citizen committees in 
Little Burgundy, however, many other Montreal communities mobilized against their residents’ 
expropriation and/or displacement from their neighbourhoods.93 As such, this episode has gained 
attention from researchers in various fields who mark it as a turning point in the phases of social 
organising in Montreal.94 
The Little Burgundy renewal program was at least discursively intended to address the 
social and economic problems in the neighbourhood as well as to improve the physical 
conditions.95 The declining population, poor housing conditions, and dwindling incomes of the 
households that existed in the neighbourhood were the types of problems used to justify the 
large-scale clearance and rebuilding project in the renewal study and proposal.96 In his 
dissertation on urban renewal in Little Burgundy, Robert Mayer has demonstrated that although 
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the language of the renewal program put emphasis on social uplifting, the actual interventions 
had little relation to the needs of the citizens and failed to consider the negative impacts the 
program would have on the existing population.97 Analysing the actual content of the plans led 
Mayer to conclude that the urban renewal program was designed to improve the profitability of 
the declining pericentral neighbourhood rather than improve the living conditions of its 
residents.98 
 Just as the renewal plans were being drafted, a new form of local organising was 
emerging in the Southwest. Beginning in Saint-Henri, which included the area that would soon 
be delimited as Little Burgundy, citizen committees began to form to take action on the physical 
and social conditions of their neighbourhood.99 These citizen committees were composed of the 
individual residents of the neighbourhood or block, supported by social animators.100 The latter 
were usually employed by family social service agencies, in particular the Catholic organization 
Conseil des œuvres de Montréal (COM). Vincent Garneau has provided a detailed account how 
the social animation project in Saint-Henri was the first phase in COM’s shift from an individual 
“case work” approach to social service provision to developing capacities and motivating 
citizens to “take charge of their own conditions and work to obtain the necessary 
improvements.”101 Though COM undeniably played an important role in the development of 
citizen committees in Little Burgundy, the Montreal Council of Social Agencies and the 
Company of Young Canadians also funded social animators in the area during the urban renewal 
period.102 The social animators helped the residents develop skills and access resources needed to 
make interventions in the conditions of their neighbourhoods.    
The Association des parents de Saint-Henri is generally recognised as the first citizen 
committee of this kind in Montreal. Its first project concerned the conditions of a local school, 
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but it soon formed a variety of subcommittees on topics such as recreational activities, 
playgrounds and community facilities, and housing.103 This parents’ association was not formed 
in response to renewal, but one of its subcommittees, Réveil des citoyens de Saint-Cunégonde, 
began organizing independently to focus on the urban renewal program in Little Burgundy after 
it was announced in 1965.104 It soon changed its name to Réveil des citoyens de la Petite-
Bourgogne to include residents in the western half of the renewal area, and acted as the citizen 
committee representing Little Burgundy.105 An English-language group simply called the 
Citizen’s Committee of Little Burgundy was also organizing in response to the urban renewal 
program around the same time.106 Though it supported Réveil’s initiatives and sometimes 
referred to itself as the anglophone component of that group, it seems to have been organized 
autonomously from the francophone committee until it integrated into the Réveil in 1967.107  
Réveil and the anglophone committee organized around the issues of the neighbourhood 
at large. But over the next decade, as the urban renewal program unfolded in phases by parcelled 
areas, it became more practical to organize through smaller citizen committees by blocks (îlots). 
The first block-level citizen group was the Saint-Martin’s Blocks Committee (SMBC), formed in 
1967.108 As the City moved forward with the subsequent phases of the renewal plan, more block-
level committees formed: comité des îlots Quesnel-Coursol (1968), comité des îlots Campbell 
(1969), comité des citoyens de Parc-Vinet (1970), and comité des îlots Parc des Seigneurs 
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(1970).109 Neighbourhood-based organising of Réveil was abandoned in favour of the block-
level committees. 
For many of these citizen committees, the first concern was obtaining information. They 
demanded that the City meet its minimum responsibility to inform the public about its plans, 
especially how they would impact citizens’ realities.110 To get information from the City to the 
public, the committees organized public assemblies with representatives of the planning 
department. The attendance at these assemblies, some of the earliest interventions organized by 
these groups, often reached 300 people.111 However, the City’s attitude toward the population 
was perceived to be paternalistic when they dismissed the questions and concerns of the 
residents, and so more aggressive tactics, like public protests, were organized.112 Jeanne Leblanc, 
president of the block-level SMBC, described the decision to stage a 1967 protest at City Hall 
about their demands on the expropriation terms as an effort to “be treated as human beings and 
not as a herd of cattle being lead to the slaughter,” which was the impression that their exchanges 
with the planners and officials had given at the public assemblies.113  
The citizen committees did not oppose urban renewal in principle.114 They did, however, 
contest the negative impacts on residents due to the top-down delivery of a pre-determined 
program designed by supposed experts. In the 1968 National Film Board film, La P’tit 
Bourgogne, members of SMBC are shown explaining to the municipal officials that their 
opposition to the urban renewal plan could have been avoided if they, the people it would 
directly impact, had been included in its creation from the beginning.115 Discussing the 
controversial rent scale established at Habitations Jeanne-Mance, one resident explained to 
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Saulnier in the film: “If there had been prior participation by citizens, it would have less difficult 
to resolve this problem.”116  
The committees’ criticism of urban renewal clearly aimed to reconstitute the basis of 
political legitimacy in urban governance and planning. Based on the information they obtained, 
the citizen committees were able to evaluate the plans by the specialists in the planning 
department and critique them from the perspective of resident experts. In highlighting the 
shortcomings of the urban renewal program for the people it was supposedly designed to aid, 
these citizen committees called into question the legitimacy of the expertise of the planning 
professionals.  
This process of delegitimization through contestation resembled the broader process of 
urban renewal activism that Klemek described, and citizens in Little Burgundy made reference to 
the broader context of the time. By the time citizens mobilized in Little Burgundy, doubt had 
already been cast on top-down planning by earlier renewal projects in the United States and 
elsewhere in Canada for their failure to address the social problems that had existed in the slums 
and for seemingly compounding problems by destroying the social ties that had developed.117 In 
Little Burgundy, citizen committees frequently framed their concerns about the plans for Îlots 
Saint-Martin in terms of not wanting to repeat Habitations Jeanne-Mance, the only other example 
of public housing in Montreal.118 In the statements from SMBC, the Jeanne-Mance housing 
project was described as a ghetto of people on welfare and a prison for its residents, who lived 
under surveillance on precarious month-by-month leases.119 The planning department tried 
reassert their legitimacy by claiming they had learned from these earlier mistakes, but the logic 
of expert-planning was called into question each time the citizen committees pointed out how 
elements of the plans for Little Burgundy would reproduce the conditions in Jeanne-Mance. 
In addition to questioning the legitimacy of top-down planning, the citizen committees 
demonstrated that members of the community were also capable of developing their own plans 
with the proper support. With the help of social animators, the committees created their own 
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proposals that addressed, or at least minimized, the shortcomings they identified in the renewal 
plans. After studying the plans for a new park, members of Réveil found the location too 
dangerous (due to the surrounding street traffic) and observed that the sequence of construction 
would create a great inconvenience for the residents of that area.120 Réveil drafted an alternative 
proposal for the park in three phases, which would create a cul-de-sac in front of the school by 
closing parts of two streets and would connect the park to the churches on adjacent blocks. When 
the committee submitted the plan to the City, the planning department admitted it was a valuable 
improvement to their own plan.121  
Other proposals were soon developed by the committees as well. In one example, the 
committees conducted surveys of families expropriated in earlier renewal projects and drafted 
their own recommendations about the relocation process.122 Although the City alleged the survey 
could not be used as it was not scientific enough, it did agree to install a relocation office in the 
neighbourhood in response.123 In another example, the committees addressed the question of how 
the rents of the soon-to-be tenants of Îlots Saint-Martin would be calculated. This was a priority 
for SMBC and one that they repeatedly raised with officials.124 The citizens made clear they 
would not tolerate the rent scale in place at Jeanne-Mance. Having no plan of their own, the 
planning department invited the committee to propose their own rent scale.125 The SMBC 
researched the question for five months and proposed a rent scale designed to balance the needs 
of lower-income residents without punishing working families that had been expropriated.126 
After modification by the City and a series of rejections and counter-proposals from the 
Province, their proposal was the basis for the rent-scale used in all public housing in Quebec, at 
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least for a time.127 The logics behind this rent scale and how it shaped the sociodemographic 
composition of public housing into the post-renewal period is discussed in chapter three. 
The City’s response to the committees’ efforts was alternatively congratulatory and 
dismissive. Improving the plans of the park may have been relatively easy to accept, only hurting 
the pride of planners, but some of the other demands were less convenient.128 The anglophone 
committee, for example, suggested that new housing be built on existing vacant lots in advance 
of the eviction notices so they would be ready to rehouse expropriated residents, a seemingly 
practical solution to the difficulty finding interim housing between demolition and 
reconstruction. In response, Saulnier merely referred them to the existing services of the 
rehousing office.129 This response illustrates the perspective of the City in general. For the City, 
the citizen committees were simply a random collection of individuals that could not be treated 
as representative. Local representation was the role of elected counsellors and it was through 
them that citizens should voice their concerns. The City might listen to citizens’ suggestions at 
times, but it did not allow the structural relationship between state and citizenry to be changed. In 
this structure, City officials made the decisions, the professionals in the planning department 
carried out the objectives assigned to them, and the citizens, whose lives were directly affected 
by the actions of the other two parties, endured the consequences.130 
Within this structure, acting as pressure groups was one way the citizen committees 
motivated a response to their concerns on more contentious issues.  Tactics included writing 
letters, circulating petitions, holding press conferences, and stirring up media interest.131 Protests 
were among these tactics, and seemed to get results. For example, after receiving eviction notices 
that did not reflect the concerns they had voiced through their meetings with the officials, the 
residents of Îlots Saint-Martin staged a protest outside City Hall.132 They presented a short list of 
demands about the terms of the notice, including delaying the evacuation date and increasing the 
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compensation, all of which were eventually met.133 A second protest took place during Prime 
Minister Trudeau’s visit to the newly inaugurated Îlots Saint-Martin. This action helped SMBC’s 
rent scale proposal advance at the provincial level.134    
Through these encounters between Little Burgundy’s citizens and state advocates of 
urban renewal, from the public assemblies to public protests, different logics of planning had 
emerged in which residents played an active role. These logics were taken up and elaborated by 
citizen committees in other Montreal neighbourhoods and would later become part of the 
platforms of municipal electoral parties. The literature on Montreal’s community action contends 
that the demands and initiatives of Réveil and the Saint-Martin’s Blocks Committee in response 
to urban renewal introduced the question of participation in urban governance into the political 
discourse and forced the City to relate to its citizens differently.135 This episode changed the 
logics of action in two ways: by shifting legitimacy from experts to citizens and by inverting the 
process from top-down to bottom-up planning through participation. 
Community participation in urban governance, first advocated by citizen committees, 
eventually became part of the electoral political agenda through the political parties that formed 
to oppose Drapeau in the late 1960s and 1970s. The first of these parties, the Front d’action 
politique (FRAP), was formed in 1969 and competed in the 1970 municipal election.136 The 
second, the Montreal Citizen’s Movement (MCM), was formed in 1974 and won its first 
majority election in 1986.137 Translating citizen priorities into a political agenda, in 1976 the 
MCM included decentralized urban governance through neighbourhood councils in its 
platform.138 Although there was no change in municipal leadership until much later, the idea had 
enough traction that in the early 1980s, Drapeau’s Civic Party proposed its own version of 
neighbourhood councils, albeit in an elite version composed of local business leaders rather than 
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ordinary citizens.139 The logics about community participation that had emerged at least in part 
through the contestation and counter-proposals to the urban renewal program by citizens had 
eventually become part of the dominant approach to urban governance in Montreal more 
generally. 
2.2 Post-renewal community participation  
Community participation was central to the forms of urban governance that emerged in the post-
renewal period, providing legitimacy to neighbourhood action that could not, as before, rely on 
the legitimacy of top-down plans and planning experts. Community participation in this period, 
however, also took different forms than the contestation and counter-proposals of the citizen 
committees of the renewal period. Post-renewal participation often involved a collaboration 
between a variety of local actors to respond to common concerns, called tables de concertation 
or roundtables for concerted collaboration. In Montreal, sectoral roundtables brought together 
actors from around the city who were working on a specific topic, such as the Table de 
concertation sur la faim du Montréal métropolitain, a roundtable dedicated to addressing 
hunger.140 Participants in neighbourhood roundtables, on the other hand, came from various 
domains, from health to employment, education to youth centres. Little Burgundy saw two 
community-led multisectoral neighbourhood roundtables for its territory during the post-renewal 
period. Later in the period, the state also initiated a roundtable (discussed in the next section). 
The first community-led roundtable covered both Saint-Henri and Little Burgundy, and its 
activities consisted mainly of making recommendations to public agencies from the perspective 
of the community. The second was the Little Burgundy Coalition, which continues to function as 
the official roundtable for the neighbourhood in the present day. With the Coalition, however, 
community members turned to developing their own plans for intervention in the conditions of 
Little Burgundy. Though the nature of the actions were different, both these roundtables were 
community-led initiatives intended to play a role in the development of their neighbourhoods.  
 Drafting documents that brought the needs and perspectives of residents to the attention 
of officials was one form that community participation took among neighbourhood roundtables. 
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In 1986, the Table de concertation des organismes communautaire de Saint-Henri et Petite-
Bourgogne (TCSHPB) formed to advance community perspectives on issues pertaining to the 
Southwest.141 As the name suggests, this roundtable was a collection of existing community 
organizations that consulted together on matters affecting the two neighbourhoods in order for 
their response to have a stronger voice. Some of the TCSHPB’s first actions included submitting 
a memoire in 1986 regarding the redevelopment of the Stelco factory along the Lachine canal 
and contributing to the city-wide public consultation on the management of the public housing 
office in 1988.142 Later, the TCSHPB also organized a conference on the community 
perspectives on the redevelopment of the Lachine Canal.143 Once the industrial heart of Montreal 
(and Canada), the Lachine Canal had lost its economic importance due to a combination of 
factors, and was designated a National Historic Park in 1974.144 Over the decades that followed, 
Parks Canada transformed the Canal into linear recreational parkway which was anticipated to be 
accompanied by redevelopment, for example through the conversion of decommissioned 
factories into condos, although this process may have advanced more slowly than some 
expected.145 The conference called for a specific plan guiding the development of the Canal that 
took into account the residents of bordering Saint-Henri and Little Burgundy, who had 
traditionally been employed by factories that were steadily closing.146 
In addition to contributing to issues affecting the entire Southwest, the Little Burgundy 
organizations involved in the TCSHPB found themselves coordinating on matters specific to 
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their own neighbourhood.147 Many of these groups had coordinated since 1984 to put on the 
annual Little Burgundy Festival.148 In 1987, Reverend Francis Xavier of Tyndale St-Georges 
community centre called a meeting of anglophone organizations that served low-income groups, 
including the Negro Community Centre (NCC), the Good Shepherd Centre, the Salvation Army, 
and the Welcome Hall Mission, to discuss concerns about the growing homeowner population in 
the neighbourhood.149 Two years later, as the insecurity around the crack trade was reaching 
crisis levels, these same groups would be among the founding members of the Little Burgundy 
Coalition.  
The Little Burgundy Coalition  
The creation of the Little Burgundy Coalition in 1989 was a new development in community 
participation in urban governance in the neighbourhood.150 Similar to the TCSHPB, this bilingual 
group was predominantly composed of community organizations working in the area, including 
the Little Burgundy members of the TCSHPB itself. However, the Coalition went further than 
the TCSHPB in certain ways. Most notably, rather than presenting recommendations or demands 
to various authorities as the TCSHPB had, the Coalition developed its own plans and invited 
government agencies to engage with them through partnerships.  
The Coalition’s overarching objective was to coordinate the efforts of neighbourhood-
based organizations to “strengthen the societal fabric of Little Burgundy while developing and 
maintaining a community identity.”151 Over twenty organizations were involved when it first 
formed, including Catholic Community Services, Union United Church, RÉSO, the Garvey 
Institute, École de la Petite Bourgogne, Maison de la Culture, Tandem Montreal #24, Amitié 
Soleil, Le Portage, and Le Gardien de Mon Frère, in addition to Tyndale St-George, the NCC, 
the Good Shepherd Centre, the Salvation Army, and the Welcome Hall Mission, mentioned 
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above.152 They collectively identified key problems, established corresponding committees, and 
drafted action plans to address the issues they had defined. The Coalition built on the financial 
and human resources of its members, believing that by acting in coordination the efforts of the 
member organizations would have a stronger impact and create meaningful changes in the 
neighbourhood. They also transcended the resources and activities of member groups, however. 
When existing services were not meeting the needs of the community, the Coalition created new 
projects. It also aimed to meet coalition-wide objectives “by making full use of external 
resources,” and as such requested support and resources from government agencies to meet its 
goals.153 
The crack trade was a major concern for the Coalition from the beginning. One of its 
main motivations was to reduce the sense of insecurity in the neighbourhood, which member 
organizations believed had reached urgent levels due to the crack crisis.154 Seeking to address 
this issue led the Coalition to propose changes to police activities in the neighbourhood. But the 
Coalition also aimed to address the broader systemic issues in the neighbourhood that members 
believed had exacerbated the problems related to drugs. For the Coalition, the insecurity 
emanating from the crack crisis was merely a symptom of these broader systemic issues and 
served as a catalyst for the community-based action that aimed to address both the immediate 
problem of insecurity as well as its underlying causes. 
Analyzing the systemic causes of the drug trade and insecurity, the Coalition found the 
legacies of urban renewal partly at fault. As the action plan of one committee explained:   
In an environment defeated by urban renovation, as is the case in Little Burgundy, 
other problems accompany the drug issue: Problems of a population rejected by 
society because of its poor employability; unemployment, poverty and health 
problems; poor relationships between French and English speaking persons and 
the various ethnocultural groups; an almost non-existent sense of belonging to the 
neighborhood; juvenile delinquency; violence; prostitution; etc.155   
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In general, the Coalition saw the insecurity issue as a result of a weakened social fabric, a 
consequence of the upheaval of renewal. This weakening ostensibly made the community unable 
respond to the underlying problems of drugs and insecurity and prevent the situation from 
reaching a point of crisis. For the Coalition, the crack crisis itself was not a legacy of renewal, 
but the social conditions that renewal had created had set the stage for the crisis.  
This analysis, tying insecurity to a weakened social fabric, shaped the Coalition’s actions 
in the early years. To improve the security of the neighbourhood and prevent the situation from 
repeating, the Coalition believed it was necessary to actively create new community ties. The 
Social Fabric Committee, the Committee Dealing with Racism, and the Festival Committee 
(which coordinated the annual neighbourhood festival) reflect the importance that the Coalition 
placed on rebuilding the social aspects of the neighbourhood that had been destroyed by urban 
renewal.156 Like other Coalition projects, importantly, these events and actions were developed 
by community-based actors, not outside experts. They were a prime example of the logic of 
neighbourhood action, constituted in the struggle over renewal, that became dominant in the 
post-renewal era. 
 Though its creation was motivated by the immediate conditions of insecurity, the 
Coalition understood this problem to be a symptom of broader social and economic issues and 
aimed to address these root causes as well. The Coalition’s Employment-Employability 
Committee was not limited to job training and placement; it also aimed to create jobs and address 
hunger by starting a food recuperation and canning operation.157 The issue of drugs was 
addressed by two committees, the Special Committee on Drugs as well as the Prevention 
Committee, which had slightly different objectives and were composed of different 
organizations. The Special Committee tackled existing drug use and associated problems such as 
criminality, and its membership included the neighbourhood crime prevention program, a drug 
rehabilitation centre, as well as the local schools and community centres.158 The spectrum of 
issues behind the Coalition’s approach to the crack crisis is perhaps best represented by the 
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permanent committees that later replaced the Special Committee on Drugs: the 
Housing/Environment/Security Committee and the Mental Health Committee.159 The Prevention 
Committee, meanwhile, was focused on creating programs to support the development of youth 
in order to promote healthy attitudes and make responsible decisions, as opposed to taking a “just 
say no” approach to preventing drug abuse.160 The action plan of the Prevention Committee 
listed 17 proposed projects ranging from peer mentoring to rap battles to after-school tutoring.161 
Supporting the youth centre Youth in Motion was important for this and other committees. 
Taken together, it is clear that through its different committees the Coalition was working toward 
improvements to the social, economic, and physical conditions of the neighbourhood by 
facilitating collaboration of organizations in different categories of activity. Although the 
insecurity of the crack crisis had motivated the Coalition’s formation, when the community 
members analysed the problems based on their experience of the neighbourhood, the solutions 
they proposed addressed the broader issues that contributed to it.  
The work of the Coalition was based mainly on the financial and human resources of the 
member organizations, but it also requested resources and support from government agencies 
and worked closely with them in partnerships. Early news articles reported that the Coalition was 
asking for participation from the City, the OMHM, the CLSC, and the police.162 In response, the 
City provided support through the Service des loisirs et du développement communautaire, 
which also handled the volet for Operation Tandem.163 The OMHM arranged for a former post 
office to be used as a community centre to host the activities of many of the Coalition’s 
initiatives and associated programs.164 The OMHM also developed its own action plan for Little 
Burgundy to complement that of the Coalition, called “Petite-Bourgogne, certifiée prioritaire,” 
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and dedicated technical support and human resources to the needs of the neighbourhood 
residents, many of whom were public housing tenants.165  
The involvement of the CLSC was also important. As social and community development 
was part of the mandate of the CLSC network, employees of the CLSCs had been supporting 
community-based neighbourhood action groups throughout the 1980s. CLSC St-Henri had 
provided secretariat and research support to the TCSHPB and seems to have done the same for 
the Coalition.166 With their help, the Prevention Committee received support through a pilot 
project with the CSSS which helped them realize numerous projects for youth, which included 
drama workshops, intercultural activities, and creating a job co-op.167  
Despite initial scepticism about the community initiative against the drug problems, the 
local police also collaborated with the Coalition and capitulated to some of its demands, for 
example by hiring a Black female police officer for patrols.168 These actions of the police are 
elaborated in chapter four. 
The activities of the Little Burgundy Coalition reflect a logic of community participation 
in which organizations that had been providing services in the community and consequently 
developed local expertise and associative networks led an initiative to substantially change the 
conditions of the neighbourhood. Independently, these community organizations had limited 
resources, but when pooled together they could support the work of developing community-
based solutions. It is this logic of neighbourhood action– rather than particular organizations– 
that I have argued emerged in the struggle against renewal and carried into the post-renewal era.  
And yet, there was some continuity between organizations involved in the anti-renewal struggle 
and the post-renewal Coalition. Some of Coalition’s member organizations, such as Tyndale St-
Georges, the Negro Community Centre, and the Good Shepherd Centre, had been operating in 
the neighbourhood well before the urban renewal projects began. Although most of the literature 
on the renewal period in Little Burgundy emphasizes the actions of the citizen committees and 
social animators, these longstanding community insitutions were also involved community 
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organising in response to urban renewal by providing space for meetings, coordinating public 
assemblies and discussions, and applying for resources from funding agencies.169 Other Coalition 
member organizations, such as Amité Soleil and CÉDA, were formed during the later portion of 
the renewal period, which the social movement literature describes as the phase when citizens 
stopped appealing to the state and instead started their own collective services such as 
community clinics, day care services, and education centres.170 Finally, some organizations, such 
as Youth in Motion, were created in response to the conditions of the post-renewal period and 
were supported by the action plans of the Coalition.171  
Although the post-renewal actors were predominantly community organizations rather 
than groups of citizens as in the renewal period, there were clearly some continuities between the 
actors of the renewal and post-renewal period. But regardless of the particular people or 
organizations involved, the actions of the Coalition in the post-renewal period relied on the logic 
of community participation that had been established by the contestation and counter-proposals 
of the citizen committees in the face of urban renewal. However, with no plans from above to 
contest and faced with problems in desperate need of attention, the Coalition directed the logic of 
community participation into a leadership modality, limiting itself neither to contestation nor 
counter-proposals. In this iteration, the community would take the initiative, plan, and govern, 
and the state could participate when invited.   
Institutionalizing community participation: Vivre Montréal en Santé  
Though the Coalition took a leadership role in community planning and development, the state 
remained involved in these processes. Indeed, working with groups like the Coalition made it 
possible for the state to govern in an era in which top-down state action and expertise had been 
discredited. No longer able to design plans for neighbourhood action in the isolation of its 
planning department, the City of Montreal was able to act through the logic of community 
participation and attempted to incorporate this logic systematically into its urban governance 
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mechanisms. The initiatives that it introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s drew on this 
logic enough to enable its state capacity to be put to use, even if these initiatives did not embody 
the ideal of autonomous community action.  
The election of the MCM in 1986 was an important moment for the logic of community 
participation within the state apparatus in Montreal. The election gave the MCM a majority of 
councillors, ending nearly 30 years of the Drapeau mayoralty.172 Although this municipal party 
had grown out of the same movements as the citizen committees of the 1960s, the MCM’s 
position on community participation in urban governance had changed over time. In the 1976 
campaign they had proposed creating neighbourhood councils throughout the city with decision-
making power on local issues. This, the MCM believed, would promote citizen participation in 
municipal democracy. By the 1980s, however, this proposal had been dropped.173 When the 
press raised the topic again in 1986, the MCM brushed off neighbourhood councils as a project 
for their second term.174 Community participation in urban governance was instead 
institutionalized through the creation of the public consultation office in 1988.175 It was this 
office that facilitated the public consultations in 1990 that informed Montreal’s Master Plan, 
which established the guiding principles of urban development in the city and its boroughs for 
the years to come.176 In this structure, community participation was clearly labelled as 
consultation and limited to an exchange of information and recommendations. Participation, for 
the MCM, no longer meant bottom-up decision-making power. 
In addition to the office of public consultation, the MCM was exploring another model of 
urban governance intended to promote the health of citizens through multisectoral collaboration 
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and community participation in their local environments.177 This model was the Villes et villages 
en santé (VVS, or Healthy Cities) program, officially launched in 1986 by the World Health 
Organization and adopted in countries around the world. VVS was based on the idea that 
physical and mental health were interconnected with social, economic, and environmental 
conditions, which converged in the living environments of people, especially in cities. Through 
this ‘territorialized’ view of health, VVS promoted the involvement of citizens in the 
development of their neighbourhoods. Unlike cities in Europe and other parts of Canada, health 
was not one of Montreal’s direct responsibilities. However, the VVS program offered a 
framework for multisectoral action at the neighbourhood scale that was consistent with the 
MCM’s perspectives on local participation that it had inherited from the renewal period, was a 
model that the City was well positioned to support.178   
The City began developing its own VVS program, Vivre Montréal en santé (VMS), 
following a successful attempt in one of its neighbourhoods. In 1988, the CLSC in Mercier-Est 
had initiated a program based on VVS in which various public agencies, including the public 
housing office, supported community members in taking action in their neighbourhoods.179 
Inspired by this experience, Montreal launched its VMS campaign in 1991 and began 
establishing committees to promote the program in ten neighbourhoods.180 A VMS promotion 
committee was established in Little Burgundy the same year, bringing together actors from 
public institutions, the private sector, the health sector, the City, public security, and residents.181 
The Coalition reported having representatives on the VMS promotion committee beginning in 
September 1991. For three years, the VMS promotion committee and the Coalition acted in 
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parallel. Perhaps the redundancy of having two multisectoral neighbourhood roundtables was the 
reason the two groups merged in 1994 to become Coalition de la Petite Bourgogne en santé.182 
Vivre Montréal en santé was discontinued after the election of Pierre Bourque and the 
Vision Montreal team in 1994, but this post-renewal initiative is significant nevertheless. It 
represents the beginning of the institutionalization of the multisectoral neighbourhood roundtable 
(tables de concertation de quartier) approach to urban governance, which continued to play a 
part in urban governance even after MCM’s defeat. After the 2002 Summit of Montreal, a 
formalized funding structure was developed for the tables de quartier and the “Tables” have 
become one of the recognised methods of community participation in urban governance at the 
neighbourhood scale.183 Community participation, it should be noted, does not take the same 
form in all Tables. Sénécal, Cloutier, and Herjean have identified two types of tables de quartier: 
one based on autonomous community organising, and the other from the VVS model initiated by 
the state.184 The main difference these authors identified was the involvement of government 
institutions in the decision making, which had more prominence in the VVS model, while those 
focused on autonomous community organising tended to resist this involvement.  
The distinction between these two participation models presented a point of tension for 
the Coalition. During their research on the neighbourhood in 1993-94, Germain and her 
collaborators observed that members of the Coalition were concerned that the VMS promotion 
committee had increased the role of government agents in the Coalition and that the community-
led Coalition risked being co-opted by the state.185 Of course, government agencies such as the 
OMHM and the police had been involved in the Coalition well before the arrival of the VMS 
promotion committee. And yet, while it is true the Coalition had always worked in partnership 
with government agencies, there also seems to have been an effort to keep these institutions at a 
distance from the operation and governance of the Coalition itself, at least initially. For example, 
the members of the Special Committee were exclusively community organizations while the 
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representatives of the OMHM, the City of Montreal, and the police sat on the committee only as 
resource people.186 Since that time, government institutions have gained more of a governance 
role, as the administrative committee in later years included representatives of institutions as well 
as community groups, citizens, and the private sector.187   
Though the structures of the Coalition and VVS model were remarkably similar, being 
initiated by the state meant the VMS promotion committee was more closely aligned with state 
interests. An evaluation of the VMS program in 1993 observed just that: although developing 
partnerships between local actors showed promising results, the City was the most interested 
party and the best positioned to promote the neighbourhood approach.188 The evaluation pointed 
to the lack of human and other resources available to community actors compared with the 
salaried public agents, which constrained their ability to participate in the roundtables. 
Developing the skills and associative networks necessary to operate in concerted collaboration 
required the work and time, all of which demanded resources. The Coalition addressed these 
resource needs by patching together what was available through its member organizations and 
focusing on a common goal, bringing in state resources where appropriate. In the VMS 
promotion committees, in contrast, the City provided the resources and support to facilitate 
multisectoral collaboration for neighbourhood action. The local actors involved developed their 
common goals through a program which was accountable to the City, which had established 
indicators to monitor the success of the program.189 When the VMS committee tried to establish 
itself in Little Burgundy, where goals and plans had been set independently of state participation, 
a clash was felt between the modes of operation. VMS provided a stability and support to 
community-based neighbourhood action, but, at least from the perspective of some Coalition 
members, this occurred at the expense of some autonomy in the decision-making process.   
Regardless of whether government institutions were engaged through partnerships or 
were involved in the governance of the roundtables, the logic of community participation served 
to legitimize state action in the neighbourhood. Unlike the renewal period, in the post-renewal 
period it was not possible for a program designed entirely in the planning department to be 
delivered to the community, as this type of top-down planning had been delegitimized. Acting in 
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partnership with groups like the Coalition, initiating community participation through VMS 
committees, and conducting public consultations on planning objectives were legitimate means 
to put state capacity to work, regardless of the level of autonomy the community members had in 
the decision-making about those actions. 
2.3 Conclusions 
The urban renewal period was a point of transition in urban governance – in Montreal and many 
other North Atlantic cities. In Little Burgundy, the top-down, expert-led urban renewal program 
was met with opposition from citizens who organized in committees formed to address their 
neighbourhood conditions. Their contestation cast doubt on the expert plans, contributing to the 
delegitimization of top-down planning. In addition, their counter-proposals helped establish that 
citizens were experts in their communities who should be involved in the development of plans 
that affected them and their living environments. The contestation and counter-proposals of 
Little Burgundy’s citizen committees to urban renewal are considered to be the first examples of 
this type of engagement with municipal planning in Montreal.  The effects of these actions were 
twofold. They served both to delegitimize top-down action and expert planning and newly 
legitimize community level decision-making and planning.  
By the post-renewal period, the ideal of community participation had become part of the 
dominant logic of neighbourhood action. The Little Burgundy Coalition operated on this logic, 
uniting the various community organizations, already active in their own sectors, to coordinate 
their efforts on neighbourhood issues. However, it also went further by taking the lead in 
developing plans to address the social, economic, and physical needs of Little Burgundy. The 
logic of community participation, though grounded in the community sector, did not preclude the 
involvement of the state. The Coalition engaged with public agencies on a partnership basis, 
which was a legitimate means of employing state capacity. Eventually, the City attempted to 
incorporate this logic of community participation into municipal planning more systematically 
by implementing the public consultation office and the Vivre Montréal en santé program. The 
latter supported neighbourhood-based action by promoting multisectoral roundtables which 
resembled the structure of the Coalition. When the two types of roundtable (the Coalition and 
VMS) existed in parallel and then merged, the tensions in power relations emerged. Both types 
were effective in legitimizing the use of state capacity, as both types were later identified in the 
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tables de quartier which had become formalized as one of Montreal’s privileged approaches to 
urban governance at the neighbourhood scale.  
This shift in governance in Little Burgundy clearly parallels changes in other 
neighbourhoods and cities. As Klemek and others have shown in the literature on the downfall of 
urban renewal, the expertise of planning professionals and top-down plans from the state were 
called into question by neighbourhood residents and activists until they had become unviable 
modes of action. Klemek also highlights the community-based planning that emerged during the 
renewal period, but concludes that the loss of funding sources undermined the ability of these 
initiatives to step into the void created by the discredited state modes of intervention after 
renewal. In the United States, he concludes urban governance was left to the whims of private 
initiatives, while in Toronto, where state action had not been so thoroughly discredited, a fusion 
of community and state governance emerged. In these contexts, the delegitimization of top-state 
action was not paralleled by the assertion of community-level power and legitimacy. 
Thus, the process of community participation in post-renewal Little Burgundy departs 
from the contexts examined by Klemek. In post-renewal Little Burgundy, this chapter has 
shown, community-level actors were able to exercise leadership. When faced with a situation of 
crisis, the resources needed to support community-based neighbourhood planning were 
assembled through collaboration between local organizations. It was after the community had 
established its goals that it sought out partnerships with state agencies to tap into state resources. 
Eventually, the state sought out the legitimacy of community actors. It was through partnership 
with the community that state action in the neighbourhood, in the form of VVS, was legitimized. 
Though this parallel initiative by the City may have had different power structures, it served the 
same function in legitimizing the use of state capacity through the logic of community-based 
neighbourhood action. It was successful enough to have survived and gained prominence the 
tables de quartier model. Though it took different forms, community participation – a logic 
formed in the struggle against urban renewal – was essential to urban governance in the post-
renewal period. Little Burgundy, a neighbourhood deeply affected by renewal, was also deeply 




3. Sociodemographic governance: Concentrated poverty and social mix 
In the 1980s, one of the ways that actors attempted to transform neighbourhood conditions in 
Little Burgundy was by managing the sociodemographic profile of the population that lived 
there. This preoccupation was not new, of course, but what was new was the conditions that 
structured it. The built environment, particularly housing, was an important factor in this type of 
governance, and Little Burgundy’s built environment had been dramatically transformed by 
urban renewal. Efforts to manage the sociodemographic composition of the neighbourhood 
involved attracting new, higher income residents by constructing homes on the land left vacant 
after renewal’s demolitions, and managing the population that made up the tenants in the 
plentiful public housing, also an outcome of renewal. In public housing, urban renewal had left a 
set of legal and administrative mechanisms that were used to maintain a sociodemographic 
balance of tenants. After these mechanisms were removed during the post-renewal period, the 
housing office (OMHM) found it had few means to manage the population that inhabited its 
properties. It thus adopted new methods, which had important effects on the sociodemographics 
of public housing. 
A focus on sociodemographic governance is a common feature in the literature on post-
renewal neighbourhoods. Specifically, this literature has highlighted how various problems in the 
large public housing complexes that were constructed during urban renewal were eventually 
framed as a caused by a high ‘concentration of poverty.’ This kind of analysis, the literature 
shows, rationalized the demolition of public housing projects and their redevelopment into 
mixed-income residential areas on the premise of creating an appropriate sociodemographic 
balance, or ‘social mix.’ The OMHM’s actions at Îlots Saint-Martin, though less dramatic, were 
consistent with this new form of analysis and action. The problems at Îlots Saint-Martin, 
especially criminality, were seen as symptoms of unduly concentrated poverty and action was 
taken to deconcentrate this population – not through the demolition of the complex, in this case, 
but through the strategic eviction of its residents.  
And yet, the situation was more complex than this rendering – focused on the OMHM – 
suggests. For one thing, a concern with sociodemographics was integral to the governance of 
Îlots Saint-Martin since the time of its construction. A rent scale, established for Îlots Saint-
Martin at the beginning of the renewal period, sought to prevent a concentration of households 
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relying on social assistance by enabling a mix of income-brackets in public housing. It was after 
the mechanisms for creating social mix adopted from this rent scale were modified in 1982 that 
the OMHM developed a newfound concern with the sociodemographics of Îlots Saint-Martin 
and Little Burgundy more generally. Perhaps more importantly, other actors in Little Burgundy 
viewed the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood differently. Members of the Coalition, in 
particular, were concerned about the arrival of higher-income residents in the southern section of 
the neighbourhood, which was growing due to the City’s efforts to attract middle-income, home-
owning families. The program that the City developed for this purpose, however, was not 
concerned with the levels of poverty in the area. Conversely, the community organizations that 
provided social services to the poor felt they were better able to serve a concentration of 
relatively low-income residents, and saw the influx of better-off families as a threat to this work.  
In post-renewal Little Burgundy there were, in sum, various efforts to manage the 
sociodemographic balance of the neighbourhood, but they have not necessarily been based on a 
problematization of a high “concentration of poverty.” Managing the number, proportion, or 
density of different social classes was one component of post-renewal governance, and though 
the aims of actors in this domain differed, they were to a certain extent shaped by legacies of 
renewal. The built environment that was left in the wake of renewal, housing in particular, 
shaped the conditions that were framed as problems and the attempts to regulate them. Some 
efforts aimed to encourage a new middle-class population to the neighbourhood to generate tax 
revenue by developing the lots left empty after urban renewal. The rent scale, developed by the 
citizen committee of Îlots Saint-Martin, was itself a legacy of renewal which had allowed the 
housing office to maintain a sociodemographic balance until the provincial laws were changed in 
the post-renewal period. When the concentration of public housing units at Îlots Saint-Martin 
served as the geographic centre of the crack crisis, the OMHM used the limited means available 
to manage the population through a combination of evictions and a moratorium on renting. All of 
these practices shaped the social landscape of the neighbourhood, through different conceptions 
of appropriate sociodemographic balance and different mechanisms available, but in many ways 
these example of governance run counter to that generally represented in the literature. 
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3.1 Urban renewal legacies: vacant lots and public housing 
The sociodemographic profile that actors sought to govern in the 1980s was significantly shaped 
by the project of urban renewal, especially through the changes to the built environment and 
housing stock. The main objective of the Little Burgundy urban renewal program, according to 
the plan report, was “the systematic and progressive improvement of the physical, social and 
economic conditions of the area as a whole.”190 The 1966 report that outlined these objectives 
stated that the housing created through program was intended for “low and average income 
people” in order to meet the needs of existing residents.191 The renewal program also aimed to 
create a separation of land uses, consecrating the section north of Notre-Dame street as a 
residential area.192 Through the large-scale demolition and rebuilding program, the City hoped to 
improve Little Burgundy’s depressed land values and attract housing development to the 
pericentral neighbourhood during a period when the central city was being redefined as a modern 
business centre.193 Although Little Burgundy was a relatively low-income neighbourhood, the 
renewal plan had more to say about changing the physical conditions than the sociodemographic 
composition, although intervening in the process of urban decline may have been motivated to 
prevent the poverty of the area from becoming further concentrated. 
 The renewal plan never achieved its development objectives. By the end of the renewal 
program in 1978, much more demolition than rebuilding had occurred in the neighbourhood. 
Indeed, Little Burgundy was left with a preponderance of vacant lots. The extensive demolition 
of existing housing, whether to build new housing, create parks, adjust the road network, or 
make room for the Ville Marie expressway, resulted in a net loss of dwellings.194 In 1981, the 
beginning of the post-renewal period, the Canada Census reported only 2,060 housing units 
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compared with 4,901 in 1961, before the renewal demolitions had begun.195 DeVerteuil claims 
that a third of land in Little Burgundy was still undeveloped in 1980.196 This loss in housing units 
was paired by a loss of population. The population, which had been declining since the mid-
century, dropped sharply from 19,810 to 5,861 in the corresponding period.197 The population 
changed, importantly, in more than just numerical terms. The housing that was constructed by 
the end of the renewal period, primarily public housing, was destined to the lower strata of the 
population.  Though public housing construction also fell short of the original targets, the most 
significant failure of the renewal program concerned the attraction of private development.198 
The 1441 public housing units completed during the renewal program represented 70.0% of all 
housing in Little Burgundy in 1981.199 The largest concentration was Îlots Saint-Martin, with 
313 family units in four square blocks.200 Meanwhile, private construction had failed to create 
housing for families with higher incomes on the lots that had been cleared in anticipation. 
Clearly, then, the renewal program had not produced the intended sociodemographic mix in the 
neighbourhood. This was the social and physical legacy of renewal that actors in the 1980s 
sought, in different ways, to manage. 
3.2 Sociodemographic governance at the neighbourhood scale 
One of the earliest post-renewal efforts to change the physical and sociodemographic landscape 
of Little Burgundy at large came from the City of Montreal. The City, at the outset of the post-
renewal period, faced a pressing problem: significant post-Olympic municipal debt, paired with a 
lack of tax revenue. The lack of tax revenue was related, in part, to the continued trend of 
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suburban development in the metropolitan region.201 With continued sprawl, the City of 
Montreal had lost many of its middle-class residents to neighbouring municipalities, who took 
their property taxes with them. Aiming to address this problem, the City introduced a major 
housing program called Operation 10,000 logements that would (it was hoped) help to attract a 
stable, owner-occupant population within the municipal borders. Little Burgundy became a 
major target of this program, which would significantly alter the sociodemographics of the 
neighbourhood by bringing in higher-income households. Recognizing the relationship of this 
program to sociodemographic governance, however, requires a closer look at the program’s 
aims, mechanisms, and results. 
 Launched in December 1979, Opération 10,000 logements was a program to construct 
housing that was both affordable and attractive to first-time homeowners within the city limits.202  
As top-down plans from the state had become unviable by this time, the program was designed 
to entice the private construction industry (then focused on the construction of suburban homes) 
back to the city. To make this possible, Logements offered lots from the municipal land bank at 
below-market rates through a call for proposals. The City attached certain criteria for type of 
construction and number of units to ensure this land was put toward homes for families.203 
Opération 10,000 logements was deemed such a success that it was renewed in 1982 as 
Opération 20,000 logements which ran until 1986. In Montreal, over 18,000 homes were 
constructed through these programs between 1979 and 1986, ninety percent of which by the 
private construction industry.204  
 Little Burgundy was a privileged site for the Logements program. This was not, however, 
because the City wanted to address a problem of concentrated poverty. Rather, it was because 
developers tended to prefer large lots, which were rare in the central city but were available in 
Little Burgundy due to the failure of urban renewal– which is to say, the preponderance of 
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undeveloped land.205 Through renewal much of this land had already accumulated in the 
municipal land bank and was ready to be offered through the program. The area also boasted 
other qualities attractive to development, such as its proximity to downtown, its access to the 
Metro, and its new infrastructure due to the renewal program.206 For these reasons, Little 
Burgundy became an important focus in the city-wide demographic and development program. 
However, Little Burgundy it did not see the success that was expected.207 Between 1979 and 
1982, 342 new dwellings were built through this program in Little Burgundy, but the private 
sector was responsible for only 145 of these units.208 The effort to attract middle-income 
households had fallen short of its objectives. 
The failure of Logements in Little Burgundy was attributed, in part, to the popular image 
of the neighbourhood. The urban renewal program had not succeeded in improving its image, as 
Little Burgundy still had a reputation as a slum.209 The City concluded that this stigma was 
discouraging developers and decided to rename the neighbourhood ‘Georges-Vanier’ to better 
appeal to middle-income families.210 In 1981 Lamarre told La Presse that Little Burgundy “is 
often considered an area for low-income housing and it is time to modify that image and to 
modify the name.”211 Whether due to this name change or other factors, Little Burgundy did see 
more development through Logements between 1982-1986, with 1179 units constructed through 
by the end of the program.212 The number of owner-occupied homes in the neighbourhood grew 
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from 105 in 1981 to 555 in 1986, and this number continued to grow after the end of the 
program.213    
 Although increasing the middle-income population was seen as a solution for the tax-
starved City government, for some members of Little Burgundy this sociodemographic shift was 
seen as a problem. In October 1987 a group of anglophone anti-poverty organizations, many of 
which became founding members of the Coalition, met to discuss the changing conditions in the 
neighbourhood and the future of their organizations.214 Reverend Francis Xavier of Tyndale St-
Georges had called the meeting due to mounting concerns about the growing homeowner 
population in Little Burgundy and the displacement of community members. He criticized City 
policies that favoured condos over forms of housing accessible to other income levels. For 
groups with a mandate to serve low-income and disadvantaged people, he argued, the 
implications of this engineered sociodemographic change were “serious to the point of being 
threatening.”215 Other groups at the meeting shared the Reverend’s concerns. The Mission Hall 
and Salvation Army observed that from their experience gentrified neighbourhoods were 
generally hostile toward support services. The increasing homeowner population also coincided 
with increasing pressure from their main funding agency, Centraide, to justify the demand for 
their services. This discussion suggests the contours of a reverse logic to the concentration of 
poverty logic. For these organizations, it was an undesirable concentration of middle-income 
households that presented an obstacle to their work with the poor, whose needs would certainly 
not disappear by being redistributed spatially. 
In these examples, the Logements program and the community response to it, the 
sociodemographics of the neighbourhood become an issue, but not in the way that the literature 
on concentrated poverty would suggest. In the Logements program, the motivation to modify or 
balance the sociodemographic composition of the neighbourhood was not necessarily based on a 
concentration of poverty logic. The aim was simply to increase tax revenues at the city scale, and 
Little Burgundy became a target because of the vacant land it possessed. The large low-income 
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population did create an obstacle to creating the desired sociodemographic balance, but 
deconcentrating poverty was never the goal and the City does not seem to have contemplated 
displacing low-income residents in order to better fulfil its development agenda. From the 
perspective of the charities working to address the needs of the poor, meanwhile, the 
predominantly low-income population was a context in which they could deliver their services 
without the complaints of a petit bourgeoisie. Considering the amount of public housing stock in 
Little Burgundy and the legal frameworks that assured it was occupied by low-income 
households, not all of the clients of these organizations would have been displaced, however 
rampant and well-facilitated by municipal policy the process of gentrification might have been. 
The management of the public housing population posed its own challenges, as the next section 
demonstrates. 
3.3 Sociodemographic governance in public housing  
From the very beginning of the urban renewal program in Little Burgundy there was a problem 
that was not simple to resolve: how to prevent public housing from becoming a “ghetto” of 
people who depended on social assistance?216 This was a question of concern for the 
expropriated residents who came to inhabit Îlots Saint-Martin. For these residents, public 
housing was not a safety net for the members of society most in need—the traditional role of 
public housing— but a replacement for their former homes, whether they were “in need” or not. 
When SMBC designed a rent scale for their new, publicly owned and managed homes, they did 
so with the objective of preventing an undue concentration of poverty and, in the same stroke, 
ensure a place for the working families that had been expropriated during renewal. The ideas 
they proposed to obtain these objectives created an opening which allowed the housing office to 
create and maintain a social mix in the public housing population. 
 Îlots Saint-Martin was the public housing first venture under Quebec’s new and still 
developing public housing laws, and the notion of exactly who public housing was intended to 
house was somewhat confused and, to a certain extent, contested. The Little Burgundy renewal 
program claimed to be designed for the existing “poor and average income” residents, and 
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expropriated residents were to have priority in the public housing built through the program.217  
This promise was difficult to reconcile with the dominant understanding of public housing in 
North American cities up to that point, which were dedicated to the poorest members of society. 
Montreal’s first public housing project, Habitations Jeanne-Mance, predated the provincial 
public housing laws and the municipal public housing office, but still served as the closest 
example of what tenants might expect of life in public housing. When the soon-to-be residents of 
Îlots Saint-Martin looked at Jeanne-Mance, they saw a ghetto of the extremely poor that they did 
not want reproduced in their neighbourhood.218 When they confronted Saulnier about the risk 
creating a segregated area of poverty at Îlots Saint-Martin, the president of the executive council 
replied that, although the existing residents should have priority, society had an obligation to 
offer any remaining housing to those in greatest need.219   
The City ultimately maintained the conventional notion of public housing as a social 
service for its most needy citizens, but had also promised public housing to expropriated 
residents, who did not necessarily fit into the category. Precisely how the City planned to meet 
these contradicting objectives was unknown: Îlots Saint-Martin was already under construction, 
but the City had still not developed its plans about the terms of the lease or calculation of rent. 
Having no plans of their own, the housing department asked SMBC to submit a proposal for the 
terms of the rent scale.220 SMBC’s rent scale, discussed in chapter two as an example of citizen 
participation in urban governance, would influence sociodemographic governance in Montreal’s 
public housing into the early post-renewal period.   
SMBC worded their proposed rent scale with explicit discourse about the risk of 
(unwanted) concentrated poverty and the need to create a social mix. They decried the 
“illogical,” “Jeanne-Mance style” of lease, saying “this solution brings about a concentration of 
very low income families, which degenerates easily into ‘ghettoes,’ grouping almost exclusively 
needy families” and making it “difficult to ensure a naturally and normally diversified 
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population.”221  They proposed two mechanisms to safeguard a properly diversified population. 
The first was to set quotas for different income brackets to fill when selecting tenants. SMBC 
proposed three categories, suggesting that the lowest income group should make up 25% of the 
tenants, based on a survey they conducted which showed a quarter of existing residents at Îlots 
Saint-Martin relied on social assistance.222  
The second mechanism was the rent scale itself. SMBC tried to strike a balance between 
the needs of low-income and better-off households by proposing two rates (18% and 25% of 
household income) that levelled off at a maximum, which became known as the ‘rent ceiling.’ In 
addition to these mechanisms, their proposed rent scale included provisions to aid large families 
as well as longer leases to provide more security to the tenants, addressing most of their fears 
about Habitations Jeanne-Mance. What was significant about SMBC’s rent scale was that it was 
designed to allow the tenants expropriated by urban renewal to remain in public housing (which 
had otherwise been seen as a form of welfare) even if their incomes increased. In so doing, it also 
introduced mechanisms to create and maintain a social mix at Îlots Saint-Martin. 
 The concepts from the SMBC rent scale were generally adopted by the OMHM and 
became the two mechanisms that managed the sociodemographic profile of public housing 
tenants in Montreal. Influenced by the citizen committee’s ideas, the OHMH had, until the 
1980s, a policy of maintaining a proportion of 35% of households to be headed by workers (of 
these, 75% male and 25% female).223 Maintaining this balance was possible because of the 
discretion the housing office had in selecting from the applicants.224 In addition to selecting 
households to attain a desired proportion of income-levels, the notion of a maximum ‘rent 
ceiling’ ensured that wage-earning families did not pay more than market rates. The rent ceiling 
was presented in the recommendations of the Rogers report in November 1969 and soon entered 
into the provincial law on public housing.225 The proposals from the citizen committee’s rent 
scale would consequently be applied to all public housing in the province.  
In the post-renewal period, however, changes to the provincial law limited these 
mechanisms and constrained the housing office’s ability to manage the social mix in its 
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properties. In 1982 the rent ceiling was removed, meaning all public housing tenants would pay 
25% of their income to rent with no maximum amount. Wage-earning households could find 
themselves paying more for public housing than what was available in the private market. The 
result was the flight of many of these families, leaving the housing office with a higher 
proportion of households relying on social assistance. The resulting sociodemographic changes 
were noticed in Little Burgundy, with its high proportion of public housing, and especially in 
Îlots Saint-Martin where the concentration was highest.   
Following the removal of the rent ceiling, maintaining a sociodemographic balance in 
public housing was more difficult, but still possible. Some working families chose to remain in 
public housing despite the removal. The housing office still exercised discretion over the 
selection of tenants and could attempt to create a socioeconomic balance through the applicants it 
chose from the waiting list. However, this modest discretion was further restrained in 1990, 
when the rules on attribution became more stringent. The housing office was subsequently 
required to select from applicants based on greatest need, as determined by an elaborate 
weighted point system.226 As a result, new public housing tenants not only relied heavily on 
social assistance, but were often also dealing with other difficulties such as heading single parent 
households or living with mental illness.227 The housing office could no longer exercise 
discretion in the selection process to establish the little social mix they had after the rent ceiling 
was removed. Both the removal of the rent ceiling and the changes to the rules on attribution 
affirmed the vision of public housing as a form of social assistance by removing the measures 
that SMBC had proposed (and the OMHM had adopted) to accommodate the expropriated wage-
earning families and to maintain a social mix.  
No longer able to maintain a social mix in its properties, the OMHM saw the 
intensification of poverty that followed as one of the determining factors of Little Burgundy’s 
crack crisis. In chapter two I described how members of the Coalition understood the crack crisis 
as a result of the weakened social fabric in the neighbourhood, leaving it unable to respond to the 
problems that accumulated until conditions had become that of crisis. However, observers from 
the OMHM attributed the crack crisis to the removal of the rent scale, the subsequent loss of 
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wage-earning population in public housing, and the increasing proportion of tenants with 
additional difficulties.228 Such an analysis attributes the crack trade and associated problems of 
insecurity partly to the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood and, in particular, the loss of 
once-available mechanisms to manage the sociodemographic balance in public housing. A high 
concentration of poverty appears here as a problem for the first time. 
Public housing tenants saw a straightforward resolution to problems of concentrated 
poverty: reinstating the rent ceiling. They raised this request on multiple occasions throughout 
the post-renewal period. In the public consultation on the management of the OMHM in 1988, in 
the action plan developed by the Coalition’s tenant committee in the early 1990s, and again near 
the end of the crack crisis in 1993.229 In these requests, the rent ceiling served both as a way to 
allow wage-earning families to remain in public housing and as a mechanism to maintain a social 
mix, just as it had for SMBC. This time, however, there was not enough political pressure to 
create room in the provincial law for the two competing visions public housing. 
When the crack trade reached the level of a crisis, the public housing office felt the need 
to respond quickly, but its means of action were limited. The OMHM attempted to manage the 
sociodemographics in Little Burgundy, and Îlots Saint-Martin in particular, through two 
initiatives which used different mechanisms. One initiative involved changing the property mode 
of units in high-density housing projects; the other used the tenant-landlord agreement to manage 
the public housing population through strategic evictions.  
Changing the property mode of some of its properties was one approach to 
deconcentrating poverty by reducing the number of public housing units. This approach was also 
a solution to allow wage-earning families to stay remain in the area. Îlots Saint-Martin was the 
largest public housing project in the neighbourhood and therefore the highest concentration 
extremely low-income tenants, but it also had the highest proportion of wage-earning families 
who chose to remain even without the rent ceiling.230 Little Burgundy’s polarised housing market 
had few options for families with modest incomes who wanted to stay in the neighbourhood. The 
OMHM had explored the idea of transferring public housing units to other modes of ownership 
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as early as 1988.231 However, after the Little Burgundy Coalition helped form a new tenant 
association for Îlots Saint-Martin and neighbours of Richmond Square, the idea was taken up 
with new vigor. Éléni Reed, a graduate student at McGill’s School of Urban Planning, 
researched the viability of converting the units to cooperative housing or establishing a rent-to-
own system and presented her findings to the tenants in July 1993. Reed noted that some tenants 
had already begun the process of creating a cooperative charter.232 Transferring units out of the 
public housing stock to a different form of ownership would serve to reduce the number of 
public housing units in the neighbourhood’s largest project, and make more housing available to 
households of modestly higher income, effectively deconcentrating the extremely low-income 
public housing population.  Despite the interest observed at the July meeting, the cooperative 
housing initiative at Îlots Saint-Martin does not appear to have come to fruition. 
Another approach reduced the overall number of tenants in public housing, through a 
strategy of evicting unwanted tenants and holding the housing units vacant. The lease between 
the landlord (the OMHM) and tenant was one of the few tools that remained at its disposal. This 
was perhaps more “demographic” than “sociodemographic” management: its most direct effect 
was to reduce the raw numbers of tenants. Although the impact of the strategy on the 
sociodemographic composition of the housing projects was limited, working in collaboration 
with police, as I describe in the next chapter, it could target individuals suspected of being 
involved with drugs. At the same time, it alleviated the burden of proof that was required in 
pressing criminal charges by passing through the civil courts of the rental tribunal. This strategy, 
which have been more effective as an extension of policing activities, began as an effort to 
manage the (increasingly “problematic”) public housing population when mechanisms to 
maintain a sociodemographic balance had been eliminated. 
Until the 1980s, the housing office was able to manage the sociodemographic 
composition of public housing in Montreal with mechanisms that were conceived of by the 
expropriated residents of Îlots Saint-Martin who were concerned that their future homes in public 
housing would resemble Habitations Jeanne-Mance, which they saw as an unacceptable 
concentration of poverty. The rent scale they developed was intended to allow for a 
sociodemographic balance that included families with modest income as well as those that 
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depended on social assistance. This idea was a departure from the conventional treatment of 
public housing, and during the time that these ideas were applied in Montreal, they enabled the 
housing office to maintain a kind of social mix.  
Although the expropriated tenants may have had a persuasive voice at the onset of urban 
renewal, in the post-renewal period the idea that public housing was a social safety net for 
society’s least fortunate retook its former place as the dominant logic. As a result, the public 
housing office was left with limited options to manage the sociodemographic composition of its 
tenants. When this was followed by the rise of criminality surrounding the crack trade in their 
largest public housing property, the housing office identified the problem as one of a 
concentration of poverty that they were powerless to prevent. They attempted to address this by 
changing the tenure type of units to reduce the density of public housing and through the eviction 
and rental moratorium, to reduce the number of public housing tenants. The fears that the 
citizen’s committee had expressed about a concentration of poverty, which their rent scale had 
been designed to prevent, seemed to have become a reality once the mechanisms to maintain a 
sociodemographic balance had been removed or constrained. Reinstating the rent ceiling, 
however, was also limited by the prevailing notions of the social role of public housing and who 
it was intended to house.   
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter examined how sociodemographic management was one of the forms of urban 
governance that emerged in post-renewal Little Burgundy. It focused, in particular, on how 
different actors analysed and/or altered the sociodemographics of the neighbourhood. This focus 
allowed us to observe not only where the concept of a concentration of poverty was at work in 
the management of sociodemographics, but also where it was absent. The two Logements 
programs undoubtedly transformed the sociodemographic composition of the neighbourhood, 
facilitating an increasing middle class and initiating gentrification, but an undesirable 
concentration of low-income residents was not the rationale behind them. In this case the vacant 
lots left by renewal presented an opportunity to attract middle-income residents back to the city 
of Montreal (the primary goal of the Logements programs). The changing demographic balance 
away from a predominantly low-income neighbourhood was, on the other hand, a source of 
concern for the charity organizations who would later found the Coalition. These groups 
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expressed beneficial aspects of concentrated poverty, a departure from most observations in the 
literature which represent actors who frame concentrated poverty in almost exclusively negative 
terms.233   
Other actions, while they mirror the dominant view of concentrated poverty in the 
existing literature, emerged much earlier than usually suggested. The rent scale developed by the 
SMBC, in particular, was positioned in square opposition to public housing as a site of 
concentrated poverty, and its recommendations allowed the housing office to maintain a desired 
of sociodemographic balance as a result. This effort to address concentrated poverty, ironically, 
emerged during the urban renewal period rather than after it. It contrasts, in this sense, with the 
existing literature’s tracing of the concentration of poverty thesis to the post-renewal period and 
programs like HOPE VI.  
Attempts to address concentrated poverty in the post-renewal period occurred after the 
SMBC-inspired rent scale policies were revoked and social mix could no longer be maintained. 
The loss of these mechanisms resulted in an increased proportion of extremely low-income 
residents in public housing and (because public housing was so prominent in post-renewal Little 
Burgundy) in the neighbourhood overall. When the crack crisis emerged, some observers, 
including the OMHM, saw concentrated poverty as its cause. The strategy of evictions and 
moratorium on renting was one of the few means by which the housing office could manage the 
population in public housing, and it applied this strategy as a short-term fix.  
Longer-term attempts to address a concentration of poverty, by changing the property 
model of certain units or by re-establishing the rent ceiling, seem to have failed, although the 
reasons for their failure did not emerge clearly in my research. The attempt to transfer public 
housing units to a cooperative model is the post-renewal initiative that most closely resembles 
the mixed-income redevelopments of HOPE VI. Like HOPE VI, the OMHM’s initiative aimed 
to address concentrated poverty by reducing the amount of public housing and by creating homes 
for better-off families in the area, but it attempted to do so by changing the legal status of the 
property rather than through a demolition-rebuilding program. The failure of OMHM’s 
alternative approach to deconcentrating public housing seems to confirm the accusations of 
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scholars who argue that the concerns about concentrated poverty that motivated HOPE VI 
merely provided a pretext for the redevelopment of coveted land.   
What is revealing about studying the various sociodemographic governance initiatives 
described in this chapter is that although each was shaped by conditions left by urban renewal 
and seem to respond to the high levels of poverty in the Little Burgundy, on closer inspection, 
their relationship to notions of concentrated poverty are unexpected, where they exist at all. The 
physical landscape transformed by renewal, both the built environment and that which was un-
built, created a preponderance of public housing for low-income residents, but scant 
accommodations for households of other income levels. The City’s Logements program was not 
designed to deconcentrate the low-income population, but rather to attract households likely to 
provide reliable tax revenue. In addition to the physical legacies, ideological and legal legacies 
shaped the way that public housing was populated. The housing office inherited a set of tools 
that had been born out of the citizen committee’s preoccupation with concentrated poverty in the 
renewal period. The OMHM’s original policies for maintaining a social mix was both shaped by 
the arguments in SMBC’s rent scale proposal and enabled by the legal structures that were based 
on its ideas. It was only after these legal structures were changed in the post-renewal period that 
the housing office began to identify problems, namely the crack crisis, as a result of concentrated 
poverty, but it had limited means to respond. While the short-term strategy of evictions and 
holding units vacant seemed to produce results, initiatives that aimed to address concentrated 
poverty in public housing in a more permanent way were not or could not be implemented.   
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4. Policing and urban governance 
One of the most visible and important changes to occur in post-renewal Little Burgundy occurred 
in practices of policing. In large part, this change involved heightened police surveillance of, and 
violence toward, the neighbourhood’s Black population. Police harassment of the Black 
population was not new, but seemed to increase at certain moments in the post-renewal period.234 
During the crack crisis, in particular, police harassment seemed to have reached new heights. In 
addition to quotidian harassment such as following Black residents and stopping them on trivial 
infractions like jaywalking or not wearing a seatbelt, the Little Burgundy police had become 
notorious for more spectacular incidents, such as entering homes without warrants and being 
implicated in the deaths of two Black men in the span of five months. Faced with actions like 
these, the Black community responded with outcry in the media, protests, and complaints to the 
police ethics commission. Accused of racism and rights violations, the legitimacy of police in 
Little Burgundy, and in Montreal more generally, was called into question. In response to this, 
Little Burgundy was selected for a new community policing program developed by the police 
narcotics unit. From heightened police repression to the introduction of Montreal’s first 
community policing initiative, policing practices in post-renewal Little Burgundy were clearly 
changing. 
The highly mediatized policing scandal in Little Burgundy during the crack crisis 
suggests that an investigation of post-renewal urban governance in this neighbourhood cannot 
ignore the role of the police. Such an investigation needs to consider how the practices of the 
police department changed in this period, but also how the relationship between the police and 
community organizations were remade. The Little Burgundy Coalition, for example, was 
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concerned with violent crime and insecurity in the neighbourhood from the beginning; this was 
the initial reason that community groups had united to form the Coalition. The Coalition sought 
to address these concerns, in part, by engaging with the police, making demands of them and 
their resources. But the police were not just a potential partner in the fight against violent crime 
and insecurity. They were also, as I noted above, a major source of insecurity, as they 
discriminated against and harassed local residents, Black residents in particular. Addressing this 
problem was part of the work of Black community organizations. These organizations worked to 
improve police-community relations, but the situation only seemed to worsen.  
Also during this period, the police began to seek the cooperation of community members 
in their work. During the 1980s, community policing had not yet become part of the approach of 
Montreal’s police service (SPCUM), despite being increasingly embraced in other North 
American cities. In the early 1990s, however, the SPCUM narcotics unit developed a program, 
called ACES, which used community engagement in the efforts to overcome the drug trade. By 
entering into partnership with community groups, the police could gain information useful to 
their own work, but they could also encourage the community to take control of spaces and 
prevent the return of illegal drug activities and their associated insecurity. These first overtures to 
community policing would be directed toward Little Burgundy, although it did not arrive not 
until the end of the crack crisis, after the efforts of the Coalition had been underway for nearly 
four years. 
 What is the relation between these changes in policing and the legacies of urban renewal?  
Three legacies stand out as potentially relevant to the question of policing in post-renewal Little 
Burgundy. The first was the weakened ‘social fabric,’ a perceived outcome of urban renewal to 
which the Coalition attributed the crack crisis and which it therefore sought to repair in its 
response to the crisis. This view of the problem and its solution became the basis of two 
important new security programs that were introduced in this period, Operation Tandem (later 
Tandem Montreal) and project ACES. The second legacy is the failure of renewal to attract the 
anticipated levels of private residential development. Efforts to address this legacy in the post-
renewal period (e.g., through the Logements programs) seem to have been hampered partly by 
the crack crisis. This ultimately provided a political-economic rationale for resolving the crisis as 
quickly as possible. The third legacy of renewal is the abundance of public housing in the 
neighbourhood and the importance of the public housing office as the landlord of the majority of 
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households in Little Burgundy. The implication here is not just that public housing (as a milieu 
of “concentrated poverty”) was blamed for the crack crisis, but also that the public housing office 
became an important partner of the police in resolving the crisis. Indeed, the housing office was 
also able to use legal mechanisms available to it (and not available to the police) in an effort to 
control the drug trade, through a strategy of evictions and a moratorium on new renters.   
Three legacies of renewal, in sum, shaped the changes in policing that occurred in the 
post-renewal period. These changes, the increase in police violence and trend toward community 
involvement in policing, were not entirely or only shaped by the legacies of renewal. However, 
investigating the relations between these periods has revealed the ways the relations between 
police, community and other state agencies were reconfigured. 
4.1 Policing and insecurity in post-renewal Little Burgundy 
Although police harassment did not begin in the post-renewal period, concerns about this issue 
began to be raised more publicly by the Black community in Little Burgundy in the mid-1980s. 
In January 1985, the Black Community Coalition of Quebec (BCCQ) wrote to Mayor Drapeau 
about the “increasing incidents of police violence between the MUC police and especially the 
[B]lack residents of Little Burgundy,” following up on a similar letter from the Negro 
Community Centre (NCC) in 1984.235  Residents warned that if things did not change “police are 
going to shoot somebody and there's going to be a riot."236   
In the period that followed, Black community organizations did what they could to 
respond to the reality of police harassment by providing resources for Black residents to defend 
their rights and attempting to create better police-community relations through shared activities. 
The organizations in question addressed the Black population in Montreal at large, but many of 
their initiatives focused on Little Burgundy where some, such as the NCC and the Garvey 
Institute, were based. The NCC was working toward an advocacy service for youth apprehended 
by police to help them defend their rights.237 These groups also facilitated interactions with the 
police and the community. For Police Week in May 1986, NCC arranged for its daycare program 
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to visit the police station, invited police to meet with children in their afterschool program, and 
held an evening panel discussion on “Youth and Police” for the community at large.238 The latter 
seems to have served as a forum for citizens to voice their outrage about the police behaviour. 
This is indicated in a letter from the NCC interim director to the officers of Station 24 following 
the event, commending the officers for enduring the “initial mistrust” and “much pent-up 
frustration and anger” of the community.239 The NCC went on to work with the police on a 
conference for Police and Minority Youth Relations later the same year.240 
The years to follow would call into question the efficacy of such programs in improving 
police-citizen relations and reducing police harassment. In a news article in 1990, the director of 
Station 24 claimed his station “was recognised for its good relations” with the Black population, 
and referred to their regular meetings with the Garvey Institute, a local private Afrocentric 
school.241 In the same article, however, Reverend Francis Xavier disagreed with the police 
director about the state of police-community relations, adding that citizens were reluctant to 
contact the police about the criminal activity in the neighbourhood because they were worried 
innocent people would be arrested.242 The article appeared on the same page as another article 
that recounted the numerous problems Little Burgundy residents had with police, in particular 
two officers from Station 24 known as Batman and Robin.243 Black residents, especially youth, 
felt these two officers regularly went out of their way to ask for identification, search, and even 
photograph them.244 “If you don’t run,” a 25-year-old resident explained, “they’re going to take 
you to the station and waste your time.”245  
Police harassment and racial profiling reached the news again when professional football 
player Tommy Kane was stopped by police during his return home to Little Burgundy from 
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playing for the Seattle Seahawks.246 Kane reported he was held for 45 minutes while the officers 
checked his identity. Responding to the controversy, the director of Station 24 defended the 
police decision to stop the local hero with a logic that suggested that questioning the actions of 
the police was itself questionable. "The ordinary citizen backs what we're trying to do," he said 
apparently without irony. "The only complaints we hear come from those we arrest."247  
By summer of 1991, the situation had only worsened. One Black youth described the 
neighbourhood as being "under siege" by police officers who followed them at night, a comment 
that bears a strange parallel to the earlier reports of the neighbourhood being “held hostage” by 
the drug trade when the Coalition first formed.248 In addition to Batman and Robin – later 
identified as officers Gilbert Gavreau (badge 4456) and Richard Prud’homme (badge 3992) – 
officer Pablo Palacios (badge 4803) had gained a reputation for himself under the nickname 
“Dirty Harry.”249 Having formerly worked in the narcotics unit, Palacios enthusiastically took on 
the fight against drug trafficking with methods described as “unorthodox.”250 In the CBC exposé 
Black & Blue, which followed Palacios on the job in Little Burgundy, Palacios was shown 
saying “I’m not here to shake hands, I’m here to kick ass.”251  
Palacios’ name was also connected with the two shooting deaths of Black men in 1991. 
In July, he was the first to respond to the call for backup in the police shooting of Marcellus 
François in a case of mistaken identity only blocks away from Little Burgundy in the financial 
district. Twenty-four year old François was unarmed in a stopped car when he was shot in the 
head, dying of the wounds two weeks later. Palacios faced ethics charges in this incident for 
arresting the passengers of François’ car without cause.252 In November, Osmond Fletcher died 
in Little Burgundy after being chased by police, from gunshots which the police claimed was 
suicide. Weeks before his death, Fletcher had been interviewed for the CBC exposé in which he 
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accused Station 24 officers, including Palacios, of being involved in the drug trade.253 The deaths 
of these two Black men fuelled growing skepticism about police racism in Montreal generally 
and only served to intensify the sense of insecurity and injustice regarding the police in Little 
Burgundy.  
For many community organizations, eliminating police violence and harassment without 
significant changes to the dominant approach to policing seemed impossible.  The Coalition, as I 
noted, was formed to address security issues in the neighbourhood. While this meant working 
with the police to address security issues stemming from neighbourhood residents (something I 
discuss in more detail below), it also meant confronting the insecurity caused by the police. At 
one of the earliest meetings of the Coalition, community members shared the organizing they 
were doing around the issue of police harassment.254 A public information session with lawyers 
was held at Tyndale St-Georges for citizens to gain information about their rights in relation to 
the police and the responsibilities of police officers toward citizens.255 While the Coalition 
affirmed the need for police action in addressing the insecurity around the drug trade, this was 
not to be at the expense of their rights as citizens. Francis Xavier told reporters at a Coalition 
press conference that excessive police action in the neighbourhood, particularly their  entry into 
homes, was “a violation of human dignity and of democracy.”256 
Black community groups confronted the police as well, most often by supporting citizens 
in defending their rights through the newly established provincial Police Ethics Commission.257 
At the end of September 1991, the BCCQ opened a hotline for citizens to report police 
harassment.258 Although this service was for all of Montreal, information gathered from this 
hotline led to fifteen complaints to the ethics commission in December of that year and five of 
these were from Little Burgundy residents against officers of Station 24.259 The accusations in 
question included use of excessive force and entry without a warrant.260 Using video footage 
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from the Black & Blue exposé, Palacios was found guilty of abuse of authority in one case and 
was ordered a suspension of five days.261 At the same time these complaints were filed, the 
community demanded these officers be transferred to another station, but the police director 
claimed this would not be appropriate while the charges were still under investigation.262 
Palacios, Gavreau, and Prud’homme were still in the neighbourhood in April 1992 when a Little 
Burgundy resident filed another ethics complaint against them.263  
It was not only these three officers, of course, who were contributing to the concerns 
about police harassment. That same month two other officers apprehended three Black teenagers, 
fingerprinting them and holding them at station 24 for three hours before releasing without 
charges.264 The boys, all three between the ages of 14 and 17, were returning home late after 
attending a baseball game with their army cadet unit. Their parents sued the police service and 
four years later were awarded damages for their mistreatment.265 The pervasiveness of the 
problem was duly noted by the Coalition. During a meeting in autumn of 1992, members of the 
Coalition observed that “the harassment of the Black community continues to be a reality in spite 
of reports of more positive relations.”266  
Efforts to improve police-community relations through mediated exchanges and events 
continued in the 1990s, but many were skeptical of such endeavours. An article that described 
meetings between the police and the Garvey Institute in 1993 revealed that young people, the 
very community members that police had the most trouble with, were not represented at these 
meetings.267 Youth, for their part, were not interested in meetings with no results, which a 
representative of one Black youth group called “verbal masturbation.”268 Throughout 1991 and 
1992, both establishment and more radical Black organizations organized protests against police 
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racism throughout Montreal to create political pressure for substantial changes, many of which 
were held Campbell Park, just across the street from Îlots Saint-Martin.269  
In this section I have traced the increase in police harassment and violence against Black 
residents that Black community organizations observed and struggled against. The accounts of 
police activity and responses to it in the archival record and news reports can only partially 
represent the conditions in the neighbourhood, but give some indication of the nature of policing 
during this period. Certainly, police harassment and mobilization against it were not limited to 
Little Burgundy nor to the incidents that were covered in the media. The situation in Little 
Burgundy in 1984 was significant enough to reach the newspapers and demand the attention of 
the mayor. In the wake of the police killing of unarmed Marcellus François, the police 
harassment in Little Burgundy received special media coverage, which peaked in the exposé that 
showed officer Palacios at work. However, as Janin Hadlaw has demonstrated, the media 
constantly cast doubt on the credibility of accusations of police misconduct from the Black 
community, and depicted Little Burgundy as a site of crisis where these actions were justified.270  
Though the events of the period are preserved through media accounts, their framing tends to 
undermine the experiences of Black residents and excuse police actions. 
The media helped the police recuperate their image, but its coverage of the community 
mobilization also helped create political pressure. At the close of 1991, Faced with growing 
mistrust and confrontation, chief of the police service Alain St-Germain contemplated plans to 
regain the trust of groups that had “lost confidence” in the police, through getting to know 
communities better and working in partnership with the public.271 In the case of project ACES, 
as Desbiens revealed, the Communications director of the police service requested Little 
Burgundy be the next neighbourhood to receive the program as an effort to improve police-
community relations following the scandals surrounding Palacios.272 The introduction of this 
new community-based policing model, I show in the next section, was another important change 
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in policing in the post-renewal period. Although the increasing police harassment does not seem 
to have been related to legacies of the urban renewal period, the turn to engaging community in 
policing does resonate with a renewal legacy.  
4.2 Policing and the community 
Instituting a new relationship between policing and the community was an important objective 
for many actors in post-renewal Little Burgundy, including certain community organizations. 
The Coalition, as I noted, often confronted the police as a source of insecurity for community 
members. However, it also sought to work with the police to combat the insecurity associated 
with the drug trade. Indeed, the Coalition was formed in response to the high levels of drug-
related insecurity in the neighbourhood, and resolving this problem was a major priority for the 
Coalition in the early years. Much of this insecurity, for the Coalition, was due to crime in the 
area, including gun violence, increase in thefts, and the use and trade of drugs.273 The sense of 
insecurity generated by these problems, the Coalition noted, left many residents afraid to walk 
alone or let their children play outside. It also affected access to services, as taxi drivers and 
pizza deliverers were observed to avoid the area.274  
The Coalition’s response to these conditions was varied and complex. As discussed in 
chapter two, its organising recognised that police action alone was not enough to address a 
problem that its members believed was rooted in wider economic and social issues. Much of its 
work, then, was focused on resolving these wider issues – usually without the aid of the police. 
Alongside this work, however, the Coalition also engaged with the police. Its very first response 
to the neighbourhood’s sense of insecurity, for example, was to call for increased police 
presence.275 It requested the establishment 24-hour police patrols and a mini-station in the 
neighbourhood, and asked that the police work with the Coalition committees in achieving their 
action plans.276 Although the police expressed scepticism that the community initiative would be 
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effective, they seem to have fulfilled many of the Coalition’s requests.277 The director of Station 
24, for example, sat as an observer and resource person on the Special Committee on Drugs.278 
Among the accomplishments it presented in a press conference in 1992, the Coalition mentioned 
that a Black policewoman had been assigned to patrol the neighbourhood.279 Though there is no 
evidence of police opening a mini-station, the neighbourhood-based crime prevention program 
Tandem (discussed in more detail below) had an office in the former post office that the OMHM 
furnished as a community centre.280   
While the Coalition engaged the police as a potential partner in addressing insecurity, the 
police and other state institutions were also seeking to partner with community organizations in 
addressing their own criminality-related objectives. In what follows here, I examine two 
programs related to policing and crime prevention, which were deployed in Little Burgundy 
during the post-renewal period. The first, Operation Tandem, was an initiative of the City based 
on encouraging citizens to develop habits that prevent crime and promote safety in their 
neighbourhoods. The second, project ACES, was a program developed by the SPCUM narcotics 
unit which involved elements of community policing that had not been used in Montreal 
previously. Although the details of their activities in Little Burgundy are scarce in both cases, 
descriptions of the projects give an idea of the logics behind their implementation. Both of these 
programs shared notions about the role of community in neighbourhood crime prevention, an 
important change in policing in this period. The community element, moreover, was partly 
related to the legacies of renewal, as it was believed that the social fabric required to promote 
safe neighbourhoods had been weakened by renewal and needed to be repaired through the 
community initiatives central to both Tandem and ACES. 
Operation Tandem 
Operation Tandem originated as a ‘neighbourhood watch’ crime prevention program 
commissioned by the City in 1982 to address a spike in break-and-enter robberies in Montreal. In 
1987, its mandate was expanded to include matters of security more generally under the name 
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Tandem Montreal.281 Tandem’s approach was based on informing residents about and 
encouraging them to adopt daily behaviours that promoted safety and discouraged crime. In a 
report of its first year of activities, the coordination team described the program as aiming “to 
make the citizen the primary artisan of their security in their environment.”282 They were also 
encouraged to become “the eyes and ears of the police.”283 As the name suggests, the program 
worked in collaboration with existing community organizations, including the Coalition, on 
initiatives related to its crime prevention and security promotion mandates. To this end, Tandem 
did not involve a centralized programming; each Tandem office developed activities with its 
partner organizations according to the needs identified in the community. Typical activities 
might include distributing bookmarks about vandalism, security themed power-lunches, marking 
bicycles and valuables to prevent theft, holding information sessions about security.284 Tandem 
worked with the OMHM in many of their homes for the elderly, launching, for example, a 
campaign to encourage tenants to remember to lock their doors at night.285 
It is not clear at what point Tandem came to Little Burgundy or what it did once it was 
established. Tandem units were geographically organized by police district until 1992 when they 
were reorganized according to boroughs.286 Station 24 was not one of Tandem’s initial eight 
districts in 1982, but there are references to Tandem #24 in Coalition documents in 1990.287 It 
seems possible that Tandem #24 opened in 1988 when the program was broadened and 
transferred to the City of Montreal’s Service du loisir and du developpement communautaire, but 
it is also possible it was created in response to the actions of the Coalition itself. The YMCA, 
located in Pointe-Saint-Charles, was the community organization responsible for the Tandem in 
police district 24. However, Tandem was one of the groups that used the community space in the 
post office in Little Burgundy that was provided by the OMHM at the request of the Coalition.288 
                                                 
281 Garnier, “Métro, quartiers, ville”; Borde, “Pour une approche territoriale de la question de la sécurité”; Montreal, 
“1982–2007: 25 années de réalisations remarquables en sécurité urbaine à Montréal, Tandem”; André Noel, 
“Opération Tandem: La collaboration avec la communauté est un succès,” La Presse, September 29, 1986. 
282 Opération Tandem cited in Garnier, “Métro, quartiers, ville,” 111. Garnier has done a very nice analysis of 
Tandem in terms of Foucault’s governmentality.  
283 «Ils sont les yeux et les oreilles de la police. » Noel, “Opération Tandem: La collaboration avec la communauté 
est un succès.” 
284 Tandem Montréal, “Tandem Montréal... Déja 10 Ans.” 
285 Welsh and Roy, “Un habitat plus sûr,” 11. 
286 Garnier, “Métro, quartiers, ville.” 
287 Little Burgundy Coalition, “Prevention Committee Plan of Action 1990-91.” 
288 “Dossier: Pour l’O.M.H.M., la Petite-Bourgogne, c’est toujours... certifiée prioritaire.” 
 82 
Aside from having a presence in the neighbourhood and having a representative on the Coalition, 
it is not clear exactly what Tandem did in Little Burgundy. By one account, Tandem was 
involved in launching the youth centre Youth in Motion.289 According to its mandate, Tandem 
would be able to use its resources and networks to support community initiatives related to 
security, which certainly applied to many of the Coalition’s projects.  
The establishment of Tandem represents an important change in policing practices – 
namely, the extension of responsibility for policing from the formal police department to the 
community at large. This extension is apparent, first of all, in the organization’s emphasis on 
constituting everyday residents as the artisans of their own security and the “eyes and ears” of 
the police on the ground. With this change, the domain of policing was significantly enlarged, 
with every citizen becoming a potential informer. The very existence of Tandem is another sign 
of this extension: an extension that gave a large role to community organizations in addressing 
criminality. Tandem, it is often pointed out, was not a police program, but neither was it an 
alternative to the police. Instead, Garnier argued, it served as an extension of the police.290 Even 
as its mandate expanded over the years to include concerns other than criminality and insecurity, 
its connection to the police was formalized in the stipulation that Tandem’s activities must 
always have the support of the police.291 
The extension of policing to the community at large is also apparent in the importance 
now assigned to community development in reducing crime and insecurity. Notably, the City’s 
1987 evaluation applauded Tandem’s role in improving social cohesion through its activities, 
especially in neighbourhoods experiencing a changing population. Indeed, the evaluation found 
that Tandem had actually failed to prevent the crimes it was created to address, but deserved 
praise for other reasons – namely, its contribution to community development.292 Following the 
City’s evaluation, Tandem’s mandate was modified to add community development to its 
objectives and to expand its field of interest from preventing specific crimes to promoting a 
broader notion of security.293 Entrusting community development to an organization committed 
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to addressing insecurity was a novel move. One of its effects was ultimately to shift the 
prevailing understanding of community development and social cohesion to become more 
closely linked to crime prevention and more likely to be valued. 
This relationship between crime/insecurity and community development is consistent 
with the analysis of groups like the Coalition, which emphasized the social causes of criminality. 
As we have already seen, in their Coalition’s view one of causes of crime was the social fabric 
that had been damaged by renewal. In this context, it would be logical for the City to deploy the 
Tandem program in the neighbourhood and for community development to become an important 
crime prevention activity. In a neighbourhood where insecurity and crime were seen to be related 
to a weakened social fabric, such as Little Burgundy, Tandem offered an attractive, community-
based form of policing.  
Project ACES  
Project ACES (Actions concertées en enquête de stupéfiants, later renamed Actions concertées 
en élaboration de solutions) was the second community-based form of policing introduced by 
the state in Little Burgundy. As counterintuitive as this might sound, the project – the first 
sustained attempt at community-based policing in Montreal – began in the narcotics unit of the 
Montreal police service (SPCUM). In 1990, some of the coordinators recognised that the 
repressive tactics they had been using were not solving the problem of the drug trade nor 
improving the quality of life for the communities where it was taking place.294 The program that 
they developed, project ACES, involved engaging with the communities where drug activity was 
taking place, partially to gain information, but also to help the community reappropriate spaces 
liberated from the drug trade to prevent the trade from returning. This initiative is often 
overlooked in histories of community policing in Montreal, which tend to focus on the 
development of the city’s neighbourhood police system deployed later in 1996-97.295   
Prior to ACES, community policing in Montreal was seen as a community relations 
effort, improving the relationship between police and community rather than changing the 
policing strategies themselves. According to the account of Daniel Desbiens, a police officer 
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involved with the coordination of ACES, the program was intended to improve the conditions in 
neighbourhoods that had been overwhelmed with illegal drug trade by working with the 
community members through a problem-solving approach. The program involved a repressive 
phase, meant to destabilize the existing drug networks, which was followed by a 
“sociopreventative” phase, in which the community re-appropriated the area with support from 
the police through a partnership approach.296 Based on this combination of repression-
reappropriation, Ouimet and Paré described ACES as a type of ‘weed and seed’ program.297 
ACES was implemented in Little Burgundy in spring of 1993, the second neighbourhood 
to receive the program.298 Upon arriving, the ACES coordination team found that the repressive 
phase of their operation was not needed, as they had already been done by “an officer” of the 
neighbourhood and the narcotics unit in 1990-91.299 Thus, they moved directly into the 
sociopreventative phase.300 Like Tandem, the sociopreventive element of the ACES program 
involved a new conception and practice of policing, one that emphasized the role of the 
community in preventing and combatting criminality. From the beginning, ACES was conceived 
of as a means for police to fight the drug trade more effectively by engaging with the community 
affected and supporting them in taking control of their neighbourhood. The need to engage the 
community in Little Burgundy was linked, in part, to the tensions created by the previous years 
of police violence and harassment. Through his interviews Desbiens learned that the decision to 
implant ACES in Little Burgundy was motivated by the outrage in the Black community 
following the police shooting of Marcellus François, compounded by officer Palacios’s 
involvement in the incident and, one can imagine, the history of police harassment in the 
neighbourhood in general. Desbiens observed that “the real reason [for choosing Little 
Burgundy] seemed to be to re-establish links of trust between the population and its police 
service.”301 The decision to send ACES to Little Burgundy was an effort to recover the 
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legitimacy that the police had lost through the outrage about police harassment at the height of 
the crack crisis. 
The program’s emphasis on engaging the community was also based on the idea that 
social cohesion in Little Burgundy had been damaged by urban renewal. Like the Coalition and 
Tandem, the designers of program ACES believed that a weakened social fabric was an obstacle 
to a preventing criminality. Writing to advise the ACES team of the conditions in Little 
Burgundy and what they could expect, a community patrol officer explained that the biggest 
challenge for the neighbourhood was rebuilding the community ties.302 She attributed the sub-
optimal conditions of the community to urban renewal, writing “the neighbourhood was 
physically rebuilt but did not build the social fabric that was destroyed.”303 She also observed 
that the growing middle-class population in the neighbourhood led the lower-income residents to 
believe that they would soon be pushed out, which left them with a damage sense of belonging. 
Despite this evaluation of the social dimensions of the neighbourhood, a survey ordered by 
ACES before entering the neighbourhood in spring of 1993 indicated that the sense of security in 
Little Burgundy was higher than the average of Montreal neighbourhoods at large.304 This seems 
to indicate that conditions had improved since the time that the Coalition identified the feelings 
of insecurity in the neighbourhood as a major concern and began mobilizing to improve the 
sense of security. 
Both Tandem and ACES were developed independent of the conditions in Little 
Burgundy and later applied to the neighbourhood. Although their specific actions in Little 
Burgundy are not fully clear from archival records, the evolution of the programs suggest that it 
was a logic of community responsibility for security, which required a strong social fabric, that 
made them appropriate for this neighbourhood. This approach to criminality paralleled that of the 
Coalition and other community-based actors, who had also credited urban renewal with the 
destruction of the social fabric and, through this, given rise to the criminality and insecurity of 
the crack crisis. Tandem and ACES can thus be understood as tools through which state 
institutions (the municipality and the police, respectively) could supply resources and support for 
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community response to crime and insecurity. Both also functioned as approaches that potentially 
improved police-community relations, or in other words, recover the legitimacy of the police. 
4.3 Legacy of stalled development   
Another change in policing that emerged in post-renewal Little Burgundy concerned the built 
landscape. It is notable that, as the crack crisis emerged, the neighbourhood had still not been 
fully rebuilt from the renewal-era demolitions and still had not attained the desired mix of public 
housing and privately built homes. This was a lingering problem. One of the objectives of the 
urban renewal program itself was to reignite development in the neighbourhood. The authors of 
the renewal study for Little Burgundy concluded that, although the neighbourhood was not yet a 
slum, it did show signs of decline.305 Thus, the renewal program was meant to interrupt this 
process of decline by demolishing the outmoded buildings that suppressed the surrounding land 
valuation, which would supposedly spur new construction and new investment to the 
neighbourhood. This was one of the foundational logics of urban renewal. As noted in chapter 
three, the urban renewal program failed to attract private development, leaving instead large 
tracts of vacant land. The City attempted to encourage private residential development in the 
post-renewal period through the programs Opération 10,000 and 20,000 logements. Private 
development was slow to establish in Little Burgundy even with this subsidized program, 
possibly due to its reputation as a low-income slum, but it did see a major in increase in private 
construction through the Logements program between 1982 and 1986.  
The ongoing failure of residential development seems to have shaped how security 
programs were viewed in 1980s Little Burgundy. A direct relationship between policing and 
property interests in post-renewal Little Burgundy is difficult to establish, but some observations 
suggest that further investigation of the role of police in protecting property and in creating the 
security conditions conducive to development might be warranted. The increase in police 
violence reported in 1984-85 coincided with the uptick in private housing development through 
Opération 20,000 logements. In the Gazette article reporting these concerns, a Little Burgundy 
resident was quoted as saying, “We get chased by cops carrying guns a lot. … I was walking 
home via the back of the new buildings they’re building in the area. Police don’t like it when 
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[B]lacks do that.”306 This juxtaposition of police harassment and the new housing developments 
is telling of the relationship between policing and property.  
The logic of property interest in relation to security emerged again as the crack crisis was 
escalating, this time from the perspective of a property owner in a letter to the editor:  
WRONG GEOGRAPHY 
I live in a beautiful, quiet area, rich with landscaped pedestrian walks, flower 
gardens and a new children's park. 
Your July 14 story, titled "Attack on crack," has erroneously lumped our area 
between Guy and Mountain Sts. into Little Burgundy. A check with city hall on 
the name of the area would inform you that officially the area commonly spoken 
of as Les Floralies belongs in Bonaventure and is not part of St. Henri or Little 
Burgundy. 
This kind of story, designed perhaps to alert the public and to influence the police 
to take action, is very harmful to the residents as the value of real estate is clearly 
affected adversely. 
Thérèse M. Brault, Montreal307 
The July 14th article that this letter refers to featured a sensational description of a 
neighbourhood gripped by violent crime that left residents afraid to leave their homes.308 Even 
after reading of the physical and psychological insecurity that her not-quite-neighbours were 
living through, Brault was still able to pen a claim that even being associated with the crime of 
the area was “very harmful to the residents” of Les Floralies. This letter articulates the stakes for 
homeowners in controlling the crack crisis in Little Burgundy. This connection shaped the 
dominant perspective on criminality and points to one of the potential logics behind the increased 
police harassment observed during the growth of a property-owning population segment.  
 In addition to threatening the interests of existing property owners, criminality and the 
crack crisis may have also deterred further development. Although the proportion of owner-
occupied units had quadrupled by the end of Logements in 1986, there is a sense that housing 
development had not reached the desired level. Planning documents from the 1980s and 90s 
make little mention of Little Burgundy and outline no significant plans to stimulate residential 
development, but the historical progression of owner-occupancy shows a trend of growth that 
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was notably stalled during the period of insecurity called the crack crisis.309 Comparing the 
census data on owner-occupied homes with renter-occupied homes from the renewal to post-
renewal period (see figure in Annex 1), we can observe a dramatic rise in owner-occupied units 
between 1981 and 1991. This growth levels off in the period between 1991 and 1996, with barely 
30 units added, only to increase by nearly 50% between 1996 and 2006. Considering the 
insecurity surrounding the crack trade started to enter the media in 1989 and continued to be in 
the news through 1992, it seems reasonable to conclude that the crack crisis was a factor in the 
lack of growth, and once it was contained development resumed. Further research into the 
geography of policing policies would be necessary to come to conclusions about the spatial 
relationship between promoting residential development and managing insecurity.  
 I have suggested here that changes in policing in the post-renewal period may well have 
been shaped by the physical legacy of urban renewal of a neighbourhood with vacant land and 
unfulfilled development which had been its promise. Many factors contributed to the struggle to 
actualize the desired level of development, and as I have already shown, there were different 
governance efforts to overcome the obstacles that were envisioned, whether by changing the 
name of the neighbourhood or subsidizing land prices for private developers.  The examples in 
this section provide clues that connect interests of development and property ownership to the 
changes in policing in post-renewal Little Burgundy. 
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4.4 Legacy of public housing coverage and one major landlord 
The final change in policing in the post-renewal period was also related to the built landscape, 
but was related in a different way than the one described above. In chapter three I outlined how 
one of the renewal legacies of the built environment was the high proportion of public housing 
units in the neighbourhood. This legacy eventually shaped how criminality in Little Burgundy 
was understood. When, in the mid-1980s, the legal structures used to create a desirable mix of 
tenants in public housing were removed, the sociodemographic profile of the housing’s residents 
shifted to become more homogenously low-income – a problematically high ‘concentration of 
poverty’ in public housing and (since public housing accounted for so much of the 
neighbourhood’s housing in general) in the neighbourhood. As the crack crisis escalated, this 
concentration of poverty was deemed by the public housing office to be partly responsible for the 
rise in criminality in the neighbourhood. The legacies of urban renewal, therefore, clearly shaped 
how criminality was understood. 
The particular sociodemographics of public housing, however, was not the only legacy of 
urban renewal relevant to conceptions of criminality and policing. In this section, I explore how 
the same legacy of the build environment, the high proportion of public housing in Little 
Burgundy, created an administrative condition that became part of the management of 
criminality and insecurity in the neighbourhood. This administrative condition was the 
predominance of a single landlord, the housing office (OMHM), which was committed to 
improving the conditions for its tenants and was willing to cooperate with the police. The 
housing office cooperated with police and used the limited tools at its disposal in the fight 
against the drug trade, including using evictions and a moratorium on new renters, to do what 
police arrests could not. These mechanisms, because the OMHM was such a significant landlord 
in the neighbourhood, became important and consequential policing practices. 
 Over the course of the 1980s, the OMHM’s activities changed in various ways and for 
various reasons. One important change was the extension of its mandate beyond that of simply 
managing public housing properties to one that involved supporting the quality of life and 
personal development of its tenants.310 Consistent with this mandate, the OMHM became more 
involved in community development, neighbourhood activities, and connecting tenants with 
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resources such as accompaniment programs for people with mental health issues.311 The OMHM 
was a partner in programs that encouraged active participation of citizens, such Tandem, as 
mentioned above, the initial experiment with of Villes et villages en santé in Mercier-Est, as 
noted in chapter two, and encouraging the creation of tenant associations.312  
Ensuring that public housing was a safe place to live was also part of the OMHM’s 
mandate. In service of this mandate, the housing office cooperated with the Coalition to re-
establish a sense of security. It also cooperated with the police, though the details of this 
cooperation are not entirely clear. The OMHM and the Station 24 police both worked in 
partnership with the Coalition, but the records available do not explain where these 
collaborations originated or what their specific motivations were. It is also unclear whether the 
OMHM’s cooperation with police and efforts to manage criminality was a new development, or 
a practice it had taken on previously. As I explain in this section, the OMHM certainly helped 
the police fulfill their duties, such as providing keys without asking for a warrant, but also used 
its own mechanisms. One practice, the eviction of tenants and keeping the dwellings empty, is 
mentioned briefly in many accounts of how the crack crisis was overcome. These practices– 
forms of policing, broadly conceived– require close attention.  
Keys and warrants 
Whether it was the first time the public housing office had collaborated with police or not, their 
cooperation was made uncomfortably public in January 1992, when the CBC exposé Black & 
Blue showed the controversial officer Palacios rifling through a ring of keys to unlock an 
apartment in a Little Burgundy public housing complex.313 Further investigation revealed the 
public housing office had given keys, including master keys, to police officers on 45 occasions 
for the purpose of raids on the crack trade. Questioned about the legality of this exchange, the 
OMHM director of tenant relations replied they never asked for warrants from the police before 
handing over keys because they had “a relationship of trust with police and we always assumed 
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they were following proper procedures."314 The police insisted that no warrants were required 
because the apartments they raided were not occupied by tenants, but were only vacant units that 
the police used for surveillance purposes and were also sometimes used by people who sold 
drugs.315 Although there was no evidence the keys had been misused, some observers were 
concerned that police would still have the keys after new tenants moved in.316 Following the 
CBC exposé, the OMHM resolved to require search warrants before lending keys to police in the 
future.317  
 This form of collaboration between the police and the OMHM parallels the expanded role 
of the community in policing activities. The change seems to have come from both ends of the 
relationship: the public housing office saw its mandate expand to include issues related to 
security (providing a motivation to collaborate more closely with the police) and the police had 
begun to place more importance on community involvement in crime prevention and repression 
(providing a motivation to work with the OMHM). The key sharing episode, revealed after two 
years of this cooperation, demonstrates that even public administrators such as the employees of 
the public housing office were not overly concerned with the strictures of the law– as these 
strictures applied to the police. The legal mechanisms to protect against abuses of police power, 
such as requiring search warrants, were not raised by the housing office until it entered public 
scrutiny. The willingness of the housing office to comply with police requests facilitated police 
action in the neighbourhood. And, because the OMHM was such a significant landlord, this 
cooperation extended to a large portion of the rental properties in Little Burgundy. 
Evictions and intentional vacancies 
It is not clear where the plan to massively evict tenants originated, but it is clear from 
descriptions of this period that this was an explicit strategy to manage the insecurity surrounding 
the drug trade in Little Burgundy.318 An action plan developed by tenants of the neighbourhood 
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La ville qu’on a bâtie. 
 92 
with the housing office’s social development and community service and submitted to the Little 
Burgundy Coalition included a call for a “more efficient eviction process for drug dealers.”319 
This suggests an eviction process was already being used to deal with criminality before the 
action plan was drafted (albeit one of questionable efficiency). The same action plan also called 
for a moratorium on renting. Here, too, it is unclear where the idea originated, but Norman 
Daoust, director of the OMHM, confirmed that the institution had adopted such a strategy in a 
written response to criticisms about withholding these units from the lengthy waiting list of 
applicants. The housing office had, Daoust wrote, “deliberately kept the dwellings vacant in 
Little Burgundy in order to be able to take care of a problem of trafficking narcotics, particularly 
in Îlots Saint-Martin.”320 The housing office used the combination of evicting unwanted tenants 
and preventing new tenants from arriving by keeping units vacant to displace tenants it believed 
were contributing to the criminality and insecurity around its properties. 
How many households were evicted by the OMHM to address the crack crisis is 
impossible to verify with the surviving data, but the numbers cited by the secondary sources give 
an idea of the range. Mackrous says around 60 households were evicted during this period, of 
which those most active in the drug trade were imprisoned, and that the OMHM held a total of 
300 units vacant in Little Burgundy.321 Reed refers to 70 vacant units at Îlots Saint-Martin 
following the evictions, though some of these may simply have been vacated by tenants trying to 
escape the crime environment.322 According to Guy Legault, 30 units at Saint-Martin had to be 
“evacuated” during the efforts to curtail the drug trade, although he does not use the term 
eviction.323  Germain et al. also report that thirty traffickers were evicted and that due to the 
moratorium on renting 20% of units at Îlots Saint-Martin were still vacant in 1994.324 
The OHMH could not simply evict tenants on a whim. Beginning in 1978, public housing 
tenants have had recourse under the Régie du logement, the provincial tribunal that adjudicates 
                                                 
319 Point 11 “Processus d’éviction plus efficace des dealers de drogue.” Mackrous, “Le développement social à 
partir de l’habitat,” 140. 
320 « Il est vrai que l’Office a maintenu délibérément des logements vacants dans la Petite Bourgogne afin de 
pouvoir régler un problème de trafic de stupéfiants, particulièrement dans les Îlots Saint-Martin. » Daoust, “Letter 
from Norman Daoust to Robert Gagnon.” 
321 Mackrous, “Le développement social à partir de l’habitat,” 141. 
322 Reed, “Remodelage des Îlots Saint-Martin,” 47. 
323 Legault, La ville qu’on a bâtie, 164–65.  
324 Germain, Marchand, and Mukakayumba, “La Petite-Bourgogne,” 180. 
 93 
cases between landlords and rental tenants.325 Cases with the Régie fall under two main types: 
rent adjustment and all other civil cases. This second category includes a range of cases, 
including non-payment of rent, not upholding one’s obligations as a landlord or tenant, or 
transgressing the lease terms. In order to evict tenants at Îlots Saint-Martin or elsewhere, the 
housing office was required to present a case to the Régie.  
I investigated two types of empirical material from the Régie to gain insight into the 
evictions that the OMHM undertook to manage the crack crisis in this period. The first, a register 
(rôle) of the cases, preserved basic information, such as the date of the hearing and the names 
and addresses of the parties involved. From this data I hoped to determine the scale at which this 
strategy was used. The second source was case decisions, which describe the proceedings of the 
hearings and their outcomes. The case decisions provide a sense of the arguments presented to 
justify the eviction request. Unfortunately, the data that has survived of these cases is partial and 
is not able to provide a comprehensive view of the cases brought to the Régie by the OMHM in 
Little Burgundy.  I located only four case decisions of OMHM eviction requests from Little 
Burgundy that survived from this period. 
I obtained the data from the register for all cases the OMHM brought to the Régie in the 
Southwest (office 34) between 1984 and 1995. In this register, however, the nature of the case is 
limited to the general category it falls under (i.e., rent adjustment or all other civil cases) and the 
article of the Civil Code invoked. While the latter may seem to provide clarification about the 
landlord’s motive for bringing the case in broad terms, when comparing the register with the 
surviving decisions we see that the clauses of the law cited in the decision are not always 
reflected in the corresponding section of the register. This data therefore does not include enough 
information to conclude how many cases were taken to the Régie for more specific reasons, such 
as non-payment of rent, and I could not make any conclusions about the extent to which the 
OMHM used the eviction-moratorium strategy. Based on the numbers of the broad category 
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“other civil cases,” at least, the data does not suggest a significant variation in cases to the Régie 
in the Southwest or in Little Burgundy over the period covered.326  
The decision file is the best source for a glimpse into the logics and motives of the cases 
brought to the Régie, providing a detailed account of the proceedings. Though decisions from 
2009 onward are publicly available online, and from the Régie itself beginning in 1999, for my 
research period (1979–1995) records of the decisions survive only in limited forms.327 The 
original decision files from 1981 and 1993 were deposited to the Bibliothèque et Archives 
national du Québec (BAnQ) in 2010; of these a 3% sample were archived and the rest were 
destroyed, in accordance with the law.328 Consulting the files for the Régie’s Southwest office I 
found very few cases involving the OMHM and all of these related to non-payment of rent.  
Another source of full Régie decisions is the jurisprudence reporters Jurisprudence 
Logement (JL), published by the Régie itself, and Jurisprudence OHM (later Jurisprudence OH), 
published by an organization representing the municipal housing offices of Quebec. These 
published cases related to rental decisions that were selected for their value as precedents in the 
interpretation of the law. Among these, one case referred to evictions from public housing related 
to drugs (OMHM v. Ruben Reid), which partially cited two other precedents (OMHM v. Alleyne 
and OMHM v. Ubald Chatelain) in its text.329 Both Reid, a case in Little Burgundy, and 
Chatelain, located elsewhere in the Southwest, had appealed their rulings to the Cour du Québec, 
and because these had not yet been part of an archival deposit, I was able to access the case files 
in their entirety. These files contained the texts of related decisions used as jurisprudence by the 
attorneys in the appeals, including three from Little Burgundy: OMHM v. Alleyne, OMHM v. 
McGuire, and OMHM v. Dixon.330 These Cour du Québec files thus provided the most abundant 
source for the text of decisions and insight into the OMHM’s eviction strategy. 
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Studying these four decisions (Alleyne, McGuire, Dixon, and Reid) with an aim to 
understand the outlines of how the evictions were rationalized, certain themes emerge. I will 
discuss the four cases here, in turn. Alleyne was a tenant at Îlots Saint-Martin. The hearing was 
held July 30, 1990, after being filed May 4th the same year. The OMHM requested her eviction 
on the basis of three points: that the tenant was using the dwelling for non-residential purposes; 
that the tenant allowed unknown occupants in the building; and that she infringed on the right of 
peaceful enjoyment of other tenants. The fact that Alleyne had allowed people to come and go 
from the premise who were “involved with trafficking, presumably of drugs” led the OMHM to 
conclude that the premises was being used for non-residential purposes.331 Alleyne admitted to 
allowing people into the building but claimed ignorance as to their activities. The tribunal 
accepted the testimony of Constable Lessard of the narcotics unit of the Montreal police that the 
apartment was used for drug trafficking. In a statement that would be cited as a precedent in one 
of the other surviving decision, the Alleyne decision noted that the officer’s testimony was 
sufficient evidence as in civil law it was not necessary to prove the accusations beyond 
reasonable doubt, but only with a “sufficient probability.”332 The use of the apartment for drug 
trafficking was deemed to have caused the OMHM appreciable harm, and Me Joly ruled in 
favour of the request to dissolve the lease and evict the tenant. 
 McGuire was a tenant of an apartment tower managed by the OMHM that faced Îlots 
Saint-Martin on des Seigneurs street. The hearing was held on October 30, 1990, after the 
request to the Régie filed on July 13, 1990. The termination of the lease was requested on the 
basis that the tenant and people he had admitted to the building not only disrupted other tenants’ 
rights to peaceful enjoyment, but specifically that their coming and going “terrorised” the other 
tenants.  It was also stated that the apartment was being used for trafficking drugs. Constable 
Lessard testified that crack had been seized at the apartment during a search. This was deemed to 
represent appreciable harm for the OMHM and justified eviction.333 Additionally, McGuire had 
received a warning from the Régie in a case earlier that year which had ruled that he must respect 
his obligation as a tenant by not disrupting the right to quiet enjoyment of the other tenants or the 
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lease would be terminated. In light of the previous case, Me Harvey’s ruling allowed only 10 
days for McGuire to vacate the dwelling.  
The request to evict Dixon from her Îlots Saint-Martin apartment was placed on 
December 19, 1990, and the audience was held in February 1991. According to the register, this 
was her second case before the Régie in less than six months, although there was no mention of 
this previous case in the decision. The decision begins by stating that the tenant allowed many 
people access to the building, and that a police search found drugs in the dwelling. Although the 
defendant did not deny these allegations, her lawyer argued for the case to be dropped as there 
had been no complaints from the other tenants and thus no appreciable harm. The régisseure, Me 
Dupont, was willing to entertain this argument, and had in fact ruled against the eviction of 
Chatelain, a public housing tenant in Verdun, in 1990 due to a similar argument.334 This time, 
however, she expressed concerns about the nature of the dwelling, which had not been raised in 
the other cases. She argued that it would be against good moral judgement to allow publicly 
subsidized housing to serve as a location for drug trafficking. The case was therefore decided in 
favour of the OMHM’s request to evict.   
Reid was the case that was published in the reporter JL for its value as jurisprudence, 
listed under the key terms changement de destination, traffic du drogue, and jouissance paisable. 
Reid lived in Little Burgundy in an OMHM public housing unit not far from Îlots Saint-Martin. 
The OMHM applied for the termination of the lease and the eviction of the tenants based on the 
claim that the use of the dwelling had been changed and it disrupted the peaceful enjoyment of 
other tenants. The Régie ruled in favour of the OMHM on October 23, 1991 on the request made 
in May the same year. Reid appealed to the Cour du Québec but the Régie’s decision was upheld 
(February 1992). Reid’s case cited both the Alleyne and Chatelain decisions and also reflected 
aspects of the other cases described above. In his defence, Reid’s main arguments were that he 
should not be held responsible for the activities of his adult sons, who did not live in the 
residence, and that the evidence provided did not definitively prove that Reid’s residence the 
location used for drug trade.335 The first argument was discounted on the grounds that in tenant-
landlord leases what mattered was that the activity was taking place in the dwelling in question, 
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not who was conducting the activity. Regarding the second argument, the OMHM cited the 
Alleyne decision which argued that in civil cases it was only necessary to prove an accusation 
within reason rather than beyond doubt. This evidence was supplied through the testimony of 
police officers as well as police documents. Finally, just as she had in the Dixon case, régisseure 
Dupont raised the concern that publicly subsidized housing should not be used to support drug 
sales. In the appeal, the provincial court confirmed the decision to evict.  
Examining these four cases, not as legal documents but as snapshots of how the OMHM 
attempted to manage the population in its public housing, reveals some of the advantages and 
limitations of the strategy that it clearly adopted in this period. One limitation is obvious: the 
process was long. For each case there were approximately three months from the time it was 
requested to the audience before the Régie. In instances where a first case resulted in a warning 
that was followed up by a second case, such as with McGuire, or an eviction decision followed 
by an appeal, such as with Reid, the time from the initial request to the final decision was about 
ten months. The point in the tenants’ action plan that called for a more efficient method of 
evicting drug dealers mentioned above seems to reflect a frustration with this aspect of the 
process. However, the advantages were perhaps worth the wait for the housing office, and 
perhaps for the police as well. 
The onus of proof in civil cases, as the decisions pointed out, was less stringent than in 
criminal cases. The OMHM needed only to establish reasonable evidence that the terms of the 
lease (i.e. changing the use of the residence) or the obligations of the tenant (i.e. infringing on the 
peaceful enjoyment of neighbours) had been transgressed for their requests for eviction to be 
sustained. The burden of proof had been a limiting factor in pursuing the individuals implicated 
in the drug trade with criminal charges. In July 1990, shortly after the Coalition had begun 
drafting its plan of action, the manager of Îlots Saint-Martin was quoted describing the 
limitations in managing the people and activities around the properties: “The problem is we don’t 
have the means to kick out the drug sellers. The simple fact that they sell crack does not give the 
right to get rid of them: you have to prove their actions.”336 Through the civil law tribunal of the 
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Régie du logement, the actions needed only to be proved to the point of being “sufficiently 
probable.”  
The evidence required to meet this standard was readily supplied by the police. The Reid 
case provides a clear example of this. Five police officers testified at the appeal hearing to evict 
this tenant. Police documents were also presented as evidence, such as a request for a search 
warrant which outlined the observations of police and informants with dates, times, and 
addresses.337 The credibility of the police played an important role in establishing this proof. The 
appeal stated that “the testimony of the police officers is infinitely more credible in the eyes of 
the tribunal than that of the other party.”338 The “other party” in this case was the witness who 
had testified on behalf of Reid that they had not noticed anything out of the ordinary around the 
residence. The credibility of police were important to the success of these cases.    
Even in cases where police had enough evidence to make an arrest, there may have other 
advantages to pursuing an eviction from public housing. The spatial consequences of evictions 
were somewhat different than in a criminal case. Like incarceration, eviction displaces certain 
unwanted bodies from a particular location, the housing unit. However, eviction does not only 
affect the individuals accused or convicted of a crime, but also extends to all others residents of 
that dwelling. Furthermore, while a prison sentence has a specified term, eviction from a 
dwelling could be effectively permanent. For example, if Reid’s sons, who were arrested for 
drug activities, had been convicted and sentenced to prison, after being released they might have 
feasibly returned to their father’s apartment. Instead, Reid’s eviction would displace the entire 
household, not only those accused of a crime, from that particular dwelling.339 Once evicted from 
public housing, furthermore, the person was no longer eligible to apply for public housing, nor 
be part of a household applying for public housing, for five years.340 Considering the small 
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proportion of private rental stock in Little Burgundy compared with public housing, they may 
have found it difficult stay in the neighbourhood at all. In this sense, eviction had the potential to 
geographically disrupt kin and neighbour networks in a way that mirrors the displacement of 
urban renewal. 
The coverage of public housing in Little Burgundy seems to have helped the eviction 
strategy succeed in Little Burgundy while it had failed elsewhere. Evictions had been used in 
attempts to control the crack trade in other neighbourhoods, but with less success. In Cartierville, 
a neighbourhood in the north which had experienced its own ‘crack crisis’ just before the 
problem had escalated in Little Burgundy, evictions were used by private landlords but failed to 
improve the security in the area.341 Some landlords evicted entire apartment complexes, but the 
unwanted tenants they aimed to displace still remained in the neighbourhood. The attempt in 
Cartierville highlights how having one major landlord to apply the strategy and exclude evicted 
tenants from the majority of the housing stock would facilitate the displacement of the unwanted 
residents compared with piecemeal implementation by a variety of landlords.  
It is worth noting here that ‘households’ in Îlots Saint-Martin mainly referred to families, 
some of them large ones. Reid’s household, for example, listed seven family members on the 
lease.342 When the urban renewal project was proposed, the study of housing needs of the 
neighbourhood’s population identified a lack of units for large families. At Îlots Saint-Martin, 
42% of the 313 units had between 3 and 5 closed bedrooms.343 Guy Legault recounted that 
architect and consultant Hans Blumenfeld had warned that this proportion of large units would 
lead to a “strong concentration of adolescents,” rather than poverty, which would present 
difficulties for the area.344 The practice of evicting families seems to run counter to a policy 
proposed by the assembly of administrators of the OMHM in 1987. Recorded in the minutes is a 
decision to follow through with the evictions of certain tenants whose cases before the Régie had 
been approved.345 Of the nine tenants presented at the meeting, only three were to be evicted. 
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The other six were not evicted “due to the fact that they were households with children.”346 The 
assembly proposed that a policy of not evicting families with children be presented to the 
executive committee of the City. However, I could not find evidence that this policy was ever 
voted on or implemented. 
 Like providing keys to empty apartments, the strategy of eviction and moratorium on 
renting involved the public housing office cooperating with the police and contributing to the 
management of security in Little Burgundy. In this case, however, the OMHM provided access 
to a civil court, which provided advantages in terms of the burden of proof. Police testimony was 
seen as more credible than that of tenants and they could easily provide sufficient evidence 
through the information gathered in the course of their duties. The end result displaced tenants 
from public housing, which effectively removed them from the neighbourhood in the case of 
Little Burgundy due to the high proportion of public housing created in renewal. This coverage 
of public housing also meant that through the collaboration of the police and the housing office, 
this strategy could be used throughout the neighbourhood in cases where tenants were considered 
problematic but there was not sufficient evidence for criminal charges. Like other changes 
outlined in this chapter, this approach extended policing into the community, but using legal 
mechanisms that were not available to community groups or the police.   
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored important changes in policing in Little Burgundy’s post-renewal urban 
governance. During this period, increasing police violence and harassment was the target of 
mobilizing and protest from the Black community. This period also saw the emergence of the 
idea that local communities could take on an expanded role in policing. The examples from Little 
Burgundy have shown that some programs concerned with insecurity, such as Tandem and 
ACES, relied on neighbourhood action, but in both cases they also promoted cooperation with 
the police as well as encouraging citizens and communities to take responsibility for local 
security. 
Not all the changes related to policing in the post-renewal period were related to legacies 
of urban renewal. The rise in police violence and harassment, in particular, does not seem to 
have been connected to renewal or its outcomes. Although the programs developed in this period 
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which engaged community in the management of security and collaboration with police, Tandem 
and ACES, were applied to Little Burgundy, both originated outside the neighbourhood. The 
community development aspects of these programs usefully addressed problems of criminality 
and insecurity attributed to the social fabric in Little Burgundy that had been left weakened by 
renewal. The failure of renewal to spur private residential construction put pressure on the City 
to create conditions that would bring the desired levels of development in the post-renewal 
period. In addition to other means of encouraging development, I have suggested that managing 
security and criminality was one of the logics that informed urban governance in this area, 
although the evidence to support this conjecture is not conclusive. Finally, the high proportion of 
public housing in the neighbourhood help facilitate management of insecurity around the crack 
crisis by positioning the housing office as the largest single landlord, whose cooperation with 
police extended over much of Little Burgundy. The willingness of the housing office to 
collaborate with police by using the administrative resources and legal mechanisms available to 
it seems to have been a method to displace those tenants deemed problematic from public 
housing where traditional police actions were less effective.  
 Examining the changes to policing in Little Burgundy in relation to the conditions of 
renewal helps view at urban governance in new light. Aside from Hinton and Goetz, few 
scholars have commented on the role of police in the post-renewal governance literature, and this 
chapter enriches this area. First, it suggests that, as police were themselves a source of insecurity, 
efforts to address police violence should be included in the category of urban governance 
alongside the other initiatives to change the conditions of the neighbourhood. Second, it shows 
that the attempts to extend policing into communities involved, at least in the instances examined 
here, efforts to support community development. This aligned with the Coalition’s understanding 
that the insecurity of the neighbourhood was at least in part due to the destruction of its social 
fabric through renewal, and it also shared logics of community participation that emerged in 
response to renewal. Third, this chapter traces interactions between policing and other forms of 
governance, illustrated in the collaboration between police and the public housing office, which 
bear a close parallel to the relationship between municipal inspectors and police that Goetz 
reported. This new relationship between the police and the housing office allowed both agencies 
access different mechanisms and resources which facilitated their efforts to change the security 
conditions of the neighbourhood. My research shows it was not just this relationship that made 
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the eviction-moratorium strategy effective, but also the spatial distribution of public housing left 
by renewal. Confirming Goetz’s assertion that policing filled the urban governance void left by 
the lack of urban policy, however, would require further research to situate these findings within 
broader directives and policies, which was beyond the scope of this project. 
Mobilization against police violence in post-renewal Little Burgundy was clearly an 
effort to change the conditions in the neighbourhood, although this is not generally viewed as a 
form of urban governance. In practice, this organising to address police violence and harassment 
paralleled the opposition of citizen committees to urban renewal in the 1960s. Contesting police 
violence undermined the legitimacy of contemporary police practice, just as the actions of citizen 
committees had for top-down planning. The new logics of community participation that emerged 
in the renewal period, as I have shown, could serve to support community interests or to recover 
lost legitimacy of the state– and this logic appears to have been transferred to apply to the police 
as well. Program ACES demonstrated both tendencies; the developers of the program may have 
been motivated incorporate community policing to more effectively address the problems 
identified by communities, but in Little Burgundy ACES was deployed instead as a means 
recover the legitimacy police had lost through the contestation of police violence. The 
similarities between the contestation of policing and urban renewal seem to suggest that in 
addition to policing, the efforts to address police violence also deserve further study as a form of 





This thesis set out to explore how the physical, social and ideological legacies of urban renewal 
shaped the forms of governance that emerged in post-renewal neighbourhoods and the conditions 
they sought to address. By examining the connections between these two periods in Little 
Burgundy, I have shown how urban renewal continued to influence the logics of neighbourhood 
development even after renewal itself had been discontinued. This research project builds upon 
the post-renewal urban governance literature and contributes to the four themes that organised 
my investigation of these questions by confirming some observations, filling gaps in the existing 
literature, and providing counterexamples to some common themes. 
Legitimacy and community participation in urban governance 
 One of the important consequences of renewal for urban governance in the period to 
follow was that state- and expert-led action became unviable after renewal was discredited, as 
authors such as Klemek have demonstrated. As in many cities where renewal took place, citizens 
in Little Burgundy contested the top-down plans that were imposed on them. I show that citizen 
response to renewal plans not only called into question the legitimacy of expert plans, but also 
positioned citizens as experts through their counterproposals. This changed the legitimacy of 
actors involved in planning as well as the process itself. Top-down planning was contested in 
favour of an ideal in which plans were developed by the residents. These findings generally 
support what has been reported in the literature in terms of delegitimizing state-led plans and 
constricting their ability to act. What my research adds is that the citizen contestation and 
counterproposals contributed to the logics that would emerge, rather than simply delegitimizing 
the existing models. While Klemek does discuss community-based planning in the renewal 
period, he says less about their influence on the logics of governance that would carry into the 
post-renewal period.  
In Montreal, the beginnings of community participation in urban governance can be 
traced, at least in part, to the way these citizen committees responded to the urban renewal plans 
for Little Burgundy. The ideas about community-based planning, brought to the forefront in 
response to the Little Burgundy renewal plans, became part of the political agenda in the period 
to follow. The Montreal social movement literature holds this episode as an important moment in 
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the history of community organising, but these scholars have less to say about the implications of 
these citizen committee actions for urban renewal and post-renewal urban governance. When 
local community organizations united as the Little Burgundy Coalition to develop plans to 
transform the conditions of their neighbourhood in 1989, the idea that community members were 
best positioned to evaluate the conditions of their living environment and develop solutions was 
put into practice, and pushed further by communities taking the lead in urban governance 
initiatives. This idea of community participation had also gained traction within the municipal 
administration, reflected in the Vivre Montréal en santé program launched in 1991. My research 
shows that while logics of community participation that emerged in the renewal period informed 
both these roundtables, the role of state agencies differed in each. In the Coalition, state agencies 
were engaged through partnerships to achieve plans developed by the community, while the 
VMS committee was meant to encourage community participation, but was more closely aligned 
to state objectives. Regardless of the form it took, in both approaches community participation 
functioned to legitimize the use of state capacity. 
Sociodemographic governance 
Achieving a desired sociodemographic balance was part of various initiatives in post-renewal 
Little Burgundy, but in terms of concentrated poverty and social mix my findings provide 
counterexamples to the way these ideas are presented in much of the literature. Some initiatives 
that appeared to respond to concentrated poverty were not directly motivated by these concerns. 
The City’s Logements programs responded to and were shaped by conditions left by renewal (as 
vacant lots, stalled development and property accumulated in the municipal land bank), but these 
attempts to increase the home-owning population in the neighbourhood were not in response to a 
problematic low-income population as much as to a lack of tax revenue. Where concentrated 
poverty did figure in the initiatives studied here, they did so in ways that departed from the usual 
observations in the literature. Not all understandings of concentrated poverty were uniformly 
negative, for example, as the responses of the local charities to the growing middle-class 
population demonstrates. These groups expressed benefits of keeping the neighbourhood 
predominantly low-income, which contrasts with the negative views reported in the majority of 
the literature, with the exception of work by Martine August. 
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In Little Burgundy, concerns about concentrated poverty had already appeared in the 
renewal period, as the citizen committee’s rent scale clearly illustrated, much earlier than most of 
the literature which claims it emerged in the post-renewal period. This concern shaped the legal 
and administrative mechanisms that the public housing office would inherit in the post-renewal 
period, and concerns about concentrated poverty would appear again after these mechanisms 
were removed. Viewing the growing insecurity surrounding the crack trade as a problem of the 
high concentration of public housing (a legacy of renewal) which was, in turn, populated by the 
poorest members of society, the housing office responded with efforts to deconcentrate poverty. 
One approach aimed to reduce the number of public housing units. The failed attempt to transfer 
public housing units into other property models used a logic similar to the redevelopment 
projects of HOPE VI, although through different means: converting public housing to 
cooperative housing would increase the housing options for higher-income households, while 
decreasing the density of public housing that had been deemed problematic without the 
demolition and redevelopment. The failure of this tenure-change initiative supports the critiques 
of HOPE VI which contend that correcting concentrated poverty was only a premise for 
initiating new rounds of redevelopment.  
The OMHM’s other approach aimed to deconcentrate poverty by reducing the number of 
tenants in public housing. The eviction and rental moratorium strategy displaced tenants, with 
the cooperation of police who served as witnesses, not only from the address covered by the 
lease but from all public housing. The success of this approach seems to have been aided by the 
coverage of public housing in the neighbourhood that was viewed as the source of the problem. 
This strategy also brought the housing office into new relationship with the police in an attempt 
to overcome the limitations of the mechanisms at the disposal of both actors. 
Policing and urban governance 
The role of policing in urban governance is the least developed area of the literature, and is 
where my research makes its most significant contribution. It was also within this theme that the 
relationship between renewal legacies and post-renewal governance was the most difficult to 
establish. I showed that in terms of managing criminality and insecurity, members of the 
Coalition saw police both as partners in overcoming the insecurity conditions in the 
neighbourhood and as a source of insecurity. Although neither police violence nor efforts to 
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counter it began in the post-renewal period, the community mobilization in response to police 
violence and harassment attempted to change the conditions of the neighbourhood, which should 
be recognised as a form of governance. The post-renewal period also saw a change in policing 
that involved a growing role of communities, illustrated here through the examples of Tandem 
and ACES. Neither of these programs originated in Little Burgundy, but they were deployed in 
the neighbourhood and shared the Coalition’s analysis that weakened social fabric created 
conditions that made crime and insecurity difficult to counter. As with the engagement of 
communities into policing, other state agencies also took on new roles in the management of 
security and in police work. The collaboration between the public housing office and the police 
demonstrates that new relationships developed in the efforts to change the conditions of the 
neighbourhood. The episode of sharing keys without search warrants suggests that the shared 
interest of managing security seems to have been greater than an interest in tenants’ rights. 
Remarks 
Not all the changes described in this study were exclusively shaped by renewal – in some cases, 
renewal seems to have little influence, if at all. Nonetheless, approaching the subject of urban 
governance by tracing connections with renewal has made visible logics of action in the post-
renewal period which are significant regardless of renewal’s influence. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by the crack crisis and the initial question that motivated this study: How was the 
crack crisis related to urban renewal, as so many accounts of this episode had suggested? The 
crack crisis itself was not a legacy of renewal, but it was shaped by conditions created by the 
renewal program. Local actors attributed the problems of the crack crisis to two of these 
conditions – the weakened social fabric and the density of public housing – although I have 
suggested that others factors also contributed.  
The efforts to address the insecurity attributed to the crack crisis were also shaped by the 
legacies of renewal. The community-led action plans of the Coalition represent a logic of 
neighbourhood action that emerged, as noted, in the renewal period. The housing office, for its 
part, was constrained by the loss of mechanisms it had inherited from renewal to manage the 
public housing population, but it was able to more effectively deploy its remaining tools due to 
the coverage of its properties in the neighbourhood. Examining responses to the crack crisis also 
demanded that certain activities which are not commonly viewed as urban governance be 
 107 
included in the analysis, although their connection to renewal was less clear. This was the case 
for policing, a theme which is neglected in the literature, as well as the responses to police 
violence and harassment, which did not figure in the urban governance literature at all. Attention 
to the connections between renewal and policing as urban governance in the post-renewal period 
put into relief the similarities between the citizen committees’ opposition to renewal and the 
Black community organising against police violence and harassment, which undermined the 
legitimacy of the means of governance they opposed. It also reveals how community 
participation was one means of regaining legitimacy in both cases. 
This thesis has shown that urban renewal continued to shape the development of 
neighbourhoods long after it had ended. The conditions it created in the social environment 
through displacement, the physical environment, through demolition and reconstruction and the 
ideological landscape, through the contest of legitimacy between ideas, shaped the problems that 
subsequent forms of governance attempted to address in these neighbourhoods as well as shaping 
forms of governance themselves. Through these conditions, urban renewal continued to 
influence the ways community participation, sociodemographic management, and policing were 
part of urban governance in Little Burgundy even in the post-renewal period. While many 
studies focus on urban renewal by tracing its rise and its fall, this study suggests there is much to 
be learned about the lasting influence of renewal by examining it from the perspective of the 
attempts to deal with its legacies.  
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Annex 1: Occupied dwellings by tenure, Little Burgundy, 1961 – 2006 
  
 122 
Annex 2: Timeline 
Renewal period  
1965 Preliminary study for the Little Burgundy urban renewal program published. 
Réveil des citoyens de Sainte-Cunégonde becomes Réveil… de la Petite-Bourgogne. 
Expropriations for the East-West Expressway (later Ville Marie Express) begins. 
1966 General report on the Little Burgundy urban renewal program approved.  
1967 SMBC protests terms of expropriation at City Hall. 
1968 Îlots Saint-Martin housing project inaugurated. 
SMBC rent scale proposed. 
1969 Residents protest at Trudeau’s visit to Îlots Saint-Martin. 
OMHM created. 
1972 East-West Expressway project approved. 
1974 Lachine canal designated a National Historic Park. 
1978 Little Burgundy urban renewal program ends. 
 
Post-renewal period: 
1979 Opération 10,000 logements launched. 
1982 Public housing rent ceiling removed. 
Opération 10,000 logements extended to 20,000. 
Operation Tandem launched in 8 neighbourhoods. 
1987 MCM majority elected. 
Operation Tandem mandate expanded as Tandem Montreal. 
1989 Little Burgundy Coalition formed in response to growing insecurity around crack trade. 
1990 Laws governing selection of public housing tenants modified. 
1991 Shootings of Marcellus François (July) and Osmond Fletcher (Nov). 
Black residents file ethics complaints against Station 24 officers. 
Vivre Montréal en santé launched, Little Burgundy promotion committee formed. 
1993 Project ACES deployed in Little Burgundy. 
1994 Little Burgundy Coalition and VMS promotion committee merge to form  
Coalition de la Petite-Bourgogne, Quartier en santé. 
Vision Montreal elected. 
